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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines communication processes surrounding political scandal. It
demonstrates that scandal coverage is improperly calibrated to the severity of scandal
accusations, with trivial but salacious sex scandals tending to receive inordinate amounts of press
attention while deeper forms of financial corruption go unreported or underreported. Patterns of
scandal coverage, in turn, result in real-world effects on public perceptions and electoral
outcomes. Specifically, sex scandals generate such intense media scrutiny that accused officials
often resign their offices rather than generate unwanted publicity. Financial scandals are often
downplayed, resulting in little or no ramifications for the accused.
Recognizing basic differences in scandal typology is key to understanding press coverage
and political ramifications of scandal. Previous efforts to explain and predict scandal coverage
tend to take a “one size fits all” approach, assuming that different types of scandal create
basically the same type of effects on public opinion and electoral outcomes. Rather than taking
an “all scandals are created equal” approach, this study sheds new light on how different types of
scandals – sexual and financial – are covered by the press, how voters react to news of these
scandals, and how differential coverage decides electoral fortunes.
Chapter 1 outlines factors that influence press coverage of political scandals. A variety of
economic and partisan incentives, and institutional journalistic routines are considered. Chapter 2
analyzes over five years of scandal news from the Pew News Coverage Index (NCI), showing
differential patterns of coverage across a wide range of scandals. Chapter 3 uses a survey-based
experiment to determine the influence of financial and sexual misconduct on judgments of
accused officials. Using aggregated data collected on members of the U.S. House from 1996 to
2012, Chapter 4 explores how the interplay of press coverage and scandal type relate to electoral

x

outcomes. Chapter 5’s conclusion suggests that patterns of scandal coverage actually make it
electorally safer for public officials to be accused of bribery or extortion than cheating on a
spouse. The findings present a challenge to journalistic accounts of official misconduct,
suggesting the need for scandal reporting to actively address scope and severity.

xi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Rationale
Anthony Weiner was a rising star in the Democratic Party. Known for delivering fiery
speeches on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, Weiner was considered a passionate
legislator, well liked in his home district, and a shoe-in to be the next mayor of New York City
(Barbaro, 2011). Weiner placed his political career in jeopardy, however, on May 27, 2011,
when he used a public Twitter account to send sexually suggestive photos of himself to a 21year-old college student living in Seattle, Washington. Partisan bloggers soon discovered the
photos and began distributing information about Weiner’s online indiscretions (Peters & Preston,
2011). The mainstream media picked up the story, describing in full the intimate details of
Weiner’s “sexting” antics– including explicit photos and messages Weiner sent to several
women living in the United States. Press attention increased, becoming so intense that
Democratic minority leader Nancy Pelosi called on Weiner to resign, which he did in a
nationally televised press conference on June 16, 2011 (Hernandez, 2011). Anthony Weiner’s
Twitter escapades had resulted in electoral defeat, not to mention a sullied reputation that he
could not escape from in subsequent elections (Durkin & Brown, 2013). Importantly, Weiner had
been removed from office and stripped of his political power, not by his constituents, but by the
influence of a national press determined to publicize the sordid details of his private life.
Cases like Anthony Weiner’s make it clear that the press is willing to expend
considerable effort reporting events that may reflect poorly on the moral character of government
officials. Also clear is the real or perceived threat that scandal publicity poses to party image and
policymaking activity, and to the leadership quality of individuals like Nancy Pelosi (Hernandez,
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2011; see Marion, 2010). Even casual observation makes this much apparent. Yet cases like
Weiner’s raise important questions about the interplay of party action, press coverage and public
response following scandal accusations. Some of these questions are straightforward and can be
answered using empirical approaches. Other, normative questions delve deeper into political
ethics, the roots of democracy, and the role of the press and citizenry in a free society. Guiding
all of these questions, which are delineated in the subsequent sections of this chapter, is a single
overarching query: Does the press take a socially responsible position in the treatment of official
misconduct, providing more frequent coverage to more severe (i.e., financial) scandals?
The national news media has been charged with exercising too much power in the
electoral process, leveraging undue influence over candidate nominations and elections
(Patterson, 1994). Scholars and pundits have also alleged that the press does a lackluster business
of informing the electorate (Patterson, 2013); that the press portrays national events through a
distorted, partisan lens (Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2011); does not “adjudicate” factual disagreements,
or tell audiences which political figures are telling the truth (Pingree, 2011); focuses too much on
less informational “soft news” (Hamilton, 2004) and political strategy (Cappella & Jamieson,
1996; Fallows, 1997); and reports issues in an “episodic” rather than a “thematic” fashion,
leading to superficial and fragmented accounts of national problems that make it difficult for
officials to govern and citizens to act (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). In short, the press has been
accused of failing to channel political information to the public, the one group in a democracy
that, theoretically, needs the information in order for democracy to function.
Citizens have noticed the shortcoming of the press. In poll after poll, the American public
takes national news media to task for its increasing focus on infotainment and sensationalism and
inability to provide a comprehensive picture of the day’s political events (Patterson, 2013). It is
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no wonder that public trust in the press bottomed out in 2012 (Gallup, 2012), or that the public’s
confidence in newspersons and television news has declined over the last two decades (see
Figure 1). If the press remains focused on trivial celebrity gossip rather than substantive policy,
crime waves instead of the causes of crime, and international athletes at the expense of
international affairs, it risks alienating citizens who rely on it for crucial political information.
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Figure 1.
American Confidence in Newspapers and Television News, 1993 – 2013
Note: Nationally representative Gallup surveys asked American adults “how much confidence”
they had in various institutions. The blue trend line represents the percentage of respondents who,
when asked how much confidence they have in newspapers or TV news, said they have “A Great
Deal” or “Quite a Lot.” The red trend line represents the percentage of respondents who, when
asked how much confidence they have in newspapers or TV news, said they have “Very Little”
or “None.” Events that may impact the public’s confidence in news are noted.
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If the press also does an inadequate job of providing the public with information about
government corruption and scandal, information that citizens need to make important electoral
decisions, then it stands to reason that the press may hold undue influence over the process of
removing dishonest or criminal persons from elected office. The question guiding this study is
therefore broad but subtle, and significant. It asks about the ability of the press to address official
misconduct by gauging accurately the scope and severity of allegations, about activities the press
considers to be the private business of public officials, and about the power of reporting to sway
public opinion and political support against an accused official. Understanding how the press
reports scandal allegations is to understand both the political influence of the press and the power
of elected officials and parties to mitigate damage, deflect blame, and restore reputation.
By pursuing this line of inquiry using a multimethod approach, this dissertation
contributes to the literature by establishing that (1) the type of political scandal – sexual or
financial in nature – influences how journalists and voters interpret the alleged misconduct, with
journalists tending to focus on sexual misconduct and voters on financial misconduct, (2) even as
voters care more about financial misconduct, economic incentives and institutional motives
engender more press coverage of sex scandals relative to financial scandals, and (3) this pattern
of coverage results in electoral losses, typically in the form of high rates of early resignations
following accusations of sexual misconduct and firestorms of unwanted media attention.
Defining Scandal
Political scandals can be defined as “actions or events involving certain kinds of
transgressions which become known to others and are sufficiently serious to elicit a public
response” (Thompson, 2000, p. 13, italics original). Scandals can occur in a variety of contexts
involving a wide range of actors and differing degrees of complexity (Marion, 2010; Thompson,
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2000). Rather than attempt to address every scandal type, and every potential context – a feat that
may be impossible, given the potentially infinite number of factors unique to each scandal – this
study focuses on two prevailing types of scandal scenarios: scandals involving officials accused
of engaging in illegal or unethical financial conduct (“financial scandals”), and those involving
officials accused of sexual impropriety (“sexual scandals” or “sex scandals”).
Financial and sex scandals both engender struggles over symbolic political power, in
which the resources of reputation and trust are at stake. Both are considered “scandals” insofar as
the “transgressions” “become known” to the public through news media. Financial scandals are
distinctive, however, in that they “generally involve hidden linkages between economic and
political power which are regarded as improper” (p. 121) whereas sex scandals represent “a
transgression of prevailing norms or codes governing the conduct of sexual relations” (p. 120).
While contextual aspects of financial and sex scandals may vary in terms of the actors involved,
the culpability of the accused, the complexity of the events and so on, financial scandals can be
conceptualized as independent from sex scandals, although certain cases may involve aspects of
both types (e.g., paying a prostitute for services rendered using taxpayer dollars).
From normative democratic, ethical and legal perspectives, financial scandals also cause
more damage than do sex scandals (Entman, 2012; Thompson, 2000). Theoretically, the public
elects officials who will represent their economic interests, who will help them compete for a
stake in state or federal resources, and who will conduct business in an ethical and legal manner.
When financial scandals occur, for instance, when a politician uses taxpayer dollars to purchase
personal items, they signify a severe breach of public trust. Financial scandals reflect negatively
on the official’s honesty and fairness, as well as their ability to fulfill their democratic role as an
elected official. Sex scandals, on the other hand, are often limited to private indiscretions that
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have “little impact on society” (Entman, 2012, p. 13). Scandals of the sexual variety involve a
breach of moral norms, but not democratic or (rarely) legal norms. Sex scandals may reflect
negatively on an official’s character, including their honesty, but the misconduct involved is
typically limited to the private judgments of the accused and do not, in and of themselves,
constrain an official’s ability to fulfill their democratic role representing public interests.
There are, of course, cases that prove to be exceptions to the assumption that financial
scandals are more damaging to democracy than are sex scandals. Improper sexual activity
involving the misuse of public funds or property, or that involve illegal actions, may cross
additional normative barriers. Officials that make promises to be “moral leaders” and later break
those promises by engaging in a sexual misconduct may also commit violations of honesty and
trust (Nelson, Dulio, & Medvic, 2002). Yet the vast majority of sex scandals do not involve
violations of democratic or legal norms (Thompson, 2000). Instead, sex scandals involve a
breach of society’s codes regulating the range of sexual activities that are considered proper or
“right.” They are set in the personal sphere of the official, involve a small number of actors, and
typically have little bearing on campaigning or policymaking. Why, then, does the press cover
sex scandals? And why does the press seemingly cover sex scandals like Anthony Weiner’s with
such zeal? Is the same intensity directed at financial scandals? Should it be? Assuming that
financial scandals are more damaging, should the press give them relatively more attention?
Media Coverage of Political Scandals
A free and responsible press is the lifeblood of democracy. The news provides the public
with a window into the inner-workings of politics, delivering the information necessary for
citizens to fulfill their roles as active and knowledgeable democratic participants. The press also
acts as “Fourth Branch” of government and a “watchdog” on government activity, alerting
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citizens to the possibility of corruption and scandal (Cook, 1996; 2005; Schudson, 1981; 2011).
However, the press may not be “properly calibrated” to the severity of political scandal (Entman,
2012, p. 2), raising the possibility that relatively trivial but sensational ethical lapses like
extramarital affairs become front page news, while serious but less sensational offenses like
bribery or tax evasion go underreported. If institutional and economic concerns motivate
frequent press coverage of salacious government affairs rather than normative concerns about the
severity of the scandal (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; 1995), there is a risk that citizens will
not have the information necessary to address severe government malfeasance at the ballot box.
Institutional, economic, partisan and individual-level journalistic concerns have the
potential to propel relatively trivial personal matters like former Democratic Representative
Anthony Weiner’s “sexting” scandal into the national spotlight for weeks, while isolated cases of
financial wrongdoing may receive little press attention. Given the option, journalists may give
easy-to-understand and dramatic sex scandal narratives “legs,” whereas the often-tedious and
complex details of financial malfeasance do not receive prolonged attention. This dissertation
demonstrates that the choices journalists make about how much attention financial and sex
scandals receive affect how the public perceives scandal, and ultimately has legitimate electoral
consequences for the representatives involved. Sex scandals like extramarital affairs, which may
have a negligible impact on governing, receive more press attention than do financial scandals,
and officials accused of a sex scandal often resign rather than face the media spotlight.
Political sex scandals should receive more coverage than financial scandals for a variety
of reasons. First, the press is not obligated to consider normative arguments regarding the effects
of different types of political scandal – financial or sexual in nature – on governing, public
opinion, or democracy writ large. Media outlets cover issues that they believe will appeal to their
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audiences and advertisers, which is increasingly soft news about government malfeasance
(Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; 1995; Patterson, 1994). The press does grant primary
consideration to the severity of a scandal, or its normative implications. Even though sex
scandals may be “personal indiscretions with little impact on society” (Entman, 2012, p. 13), the
press nonetheless treats them as noteworthy events, as much or more so than financial scandals.
Sex scandals may also garner more coverage than financial scandals because they fit
perfectly within the framework of institutional news norms and routines, as well as aspects of the
contemporary media environment. While all types of political scandals may possess elements
that appeal to a news organization’s audience- and profit-seeking motives, sex scandals contain
particularly compelling, sensational elements that make them attractive to journalists and media
organizations. Specifically, sex scandals almost always involve dramatic narratives, a common
prerequisite for stories in modern journalism (Cook, 1996; 2005; Gans, 2004; Patterson, 1994).
A sex scandal is essentially a dramatic and entertaining event that stirs up audience interest,
eventually translating into increased revenues from advertisers who want to reach wider markets
(McManus, 1994; 1995; Hamilton, 2004). Regardless of a sex scandal’s impact on public
opinion of elected officials, or on the electoral fortunes of officials involved, the media focus on
sex scandals for the human-interest factor. Financial scandals can certainly be dramatic and
engender significant amounts of news coverage, but sex scandals are particularly exciting human
dramas that illustrate the very ordinary flaws of extraordinary citizens (Dagnes, 2011).
Third, sex scandals are relatively easy for both the journalist and the audience to
understand. Sex scandals typically involve only a few actors, and the natural human conflict at
the heart of a sexual indiscretion such as an extramarital affair is easily conveyed by the
journalist and easily interpreted by the audience. Financial scandals are relatively more complex
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events, often requiring journalists and audiences to understand bureaucratic procedure to
comprehend the magnitude of the transgression. The press should therefore tend to focus less on
financial scandals, even though financial scandals may have more profound consequences for
democratic and legislative processes than do sexual indiscretions (Thompson, 1995).
Finally, media have increasingly limited budgets to pursue original and investigative
political reporting (Arnold, 2006; Patterson, 2013). With increasingly limited budgets come staff
reductions and the need to cover political events that do not require extensive amounts of
personnel or economic resources. Sex scandals typically meet these criteria. The average sex
scandal does not require the same amount of resources to cover than does the average financial
scandal. Whereas a financial scandal might involve multiple interviews and long-term
investigation, information about a sexual scandal is typically given to a reporter by members of
the rival party or stumbled upon by curious journalists (Entman, 2012; Marion, 2010). The
personnel and resources that the press devotes to sex scandals is minimal compared to that
required to investigate financial scandals. For these reasons, it is expected that media coverage of
political sex scandals tends to be greater than media coverage of financial scandals. Formally,
H1: Sex scandals will receive more frequent media coverage than financial scandals.
For-profit media organizations have audience-motivated, economic incentives to cover
sex scandals, no matter the severity or repercussions sex scandals have on public opinion,
electoral outcomes, or the lawmaking process. Sex scandals appeal to the media’s bottom line,
which is establishing a sound financial footing (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; 1995), even
though it plausible that financial scandals matter more for democracy.
“Hard News” and “Soft News.” Since the 1960s, the press has focused on selling news
products using dramatic and sensational narratives (Gans, 2004; Patterson, 1994; Schudson,

9

2011). Indeed, news producers tend to conceptualize news narratives as dramas meant to
entertain and captivate rather than information meant to enlighten (Epstein, 2000). In one famous
memo, NBC Nightly News producer Reuven Frank explains the need for drama in news stories:
Every news story should, without any sacrifice of probity or responsibility display
the attributes of fiction, of drama. It should have a structure and conflict, problem
and denouement, rising action and falling action, a beginning, a middle, and an end.
These are not only the essentials of drama; they are the essentials of narrative.
Frank quoted in Epstein (2000, p. 4-5)
Frank wrote his memo in the 1960s. In this sense, “soft news” that focuses on
entertaining and dramatic narratives has been a staple of mainstream news production for over 50
years. News is a commodity that is bought and sold and entertaining narratives that contain
elements of “fiction” and “drama” are needed for news products to compete in the marketplace.
Yet the demand for soft news content, and the market pressure for news organizations to
produce this type of content have increased steadily since the 1960s (Patterson, 2013). With the
advent of cable television and the Internet, audiences were offered more entertaining alternatives
to the nightly news and the “hard” public affairs news typically found in major daily newspapers.
Not only did cable TV and the Internet offer news consumers more entertaining and interactive
news products, they offered audiences a vast array of “pure” entertainment options such as film,
made-for-TV movies, music streaming, pornography, social networking and interpersonal
applications, video games and so on (Fallows, 1997; McChesney, 2004; Patterson, 2013).
The mainstream press has responded to increasing numbers of entertainment options by
trying to appeal to specific audiences with specific tastes. Major daily newspapers and the
National Public Radio system now attempt to reach “hard news” audiences who want substantive
public affairs information (Hamilton, 2004). Network news has responded by becoming even
“softer.” Cable TV networks and online outlets tend to provide arguably the most sensational
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programming. Given that the agendas and audiences of these media sectors have become
fragmented, it is possible that major daily newspapers and radio news pay little attention to
political sex scandals and focus more attention and resources on investigating deeper forms of
financial corruption. In order to appeal to their own niche audience, network television, cable
television, and online news outlets may spend more time discussing the latest salacious sex
scandal than the comparatively dry details of the average financial scandal. Formally,
H2A: Media sectors that tend to focus on “hard news” – newspapers and radio – will
cover financial scandals more frequently than sex scandals.
H2B: Media sectors that tend to focus on “soft news” – network TV, cable TV, and
online news – will cover sex scandals more frequently than financial scandals.
If newspapers and radio programming tend to focus on delivering hard-hitting public
affairs content on political corruption, television and online news outlets are just as attentive to
the kind of soft news qualities that are inherent in political sex scandals.
It is possible, however, that specific news sources within each broad media sector –
newspapers, radio, network TV, cable TV, online – cater to particular niche audience. While
newspapers like The Wall Street Journal and radio shows like NPR’s Morning Edition and Talk
of the Nation may spend significant airtime discussing financial corruption in Congress, other
radio programs may give such scandals comparatively little attention. The agenda of these
specific outlets may diverge greatly from other outlets within their sector. Similarly, issues that
are discussed on The Today Show will not perfectly correspond with the mainstream news
agenda because these shows cater to specific demographics, particularly younger female viewers
(Hamilton, 2004). The same is true of programming on other early morning programs like CBS’s
The Early Show and ABC’s Good Morning America. Online news outlets that must compete for
audience attention among a multitude of alternative Internet sources must increasingly create soft
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news content. News websites like The Huffington Post must, therefore, provide dramatic and
attention-grabbing content that will appeal to younger demographics. Stories about political sex
scandals fit this description. This study therefore posits competing expectations about particular
“hard” and “soft” news outlets within each media sector. Formally, this study expects that:
H3A: “Hard news” sources The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the PBS
Newshour with Jim Lehrer, and NPR news programs Morning Edition and Talk of the
Nation will more frequently cover official financial misconduct than sexual misconduct.
H3B: “Soft news” sources The Today Show, The Early Show, Good Morning America,
and The Huffington Post will more frequently cover official sexual misconduct than
financial misconduct.
While the agendas of these outlets may often overlap, each outlet will also be driven by
specific, supply- and demand-side considerations that influence scandal coverage. Although the
recession and the Internet have taken a toll on newsroom budgets in recent years, the extensive
economic and personnel resources at the disposal of The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal may allow for more investigative reporting of complex and far-reaching political
scandals involving money trails and financial deception. Likewise, PBS and NPR have extensive
resources to investigate cases of financial wrongdoing in the political sphere. The same cannot
be said of morning current events outlets Good Morning America or news sites like The
Huffington Post that are expected to turn a profit by bringing in consistent ad revenues. On the
demand-side, The Times and NPR’s audiences tend to be older and more politically informed
viewers who want meaningful public affairs news, while outlets like The Early Show seek
younger and less informed demographics who increasingly want sexiness over substance.
Partisan Influences and Niche News. Coverage of financial and sexual scandals may
also be influenced by partisan treatment of scandal allegations. Recent changes in the media
environment and in how audiences consume media may have broadly altered news agendas and
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therefore audience perceptions of issue importance. One of the most conspicuous changes in the
media environment is that news channels and audiences are increasingly divided along partisan
lines (Stroud, 2008; 2010). This phenomenon has been deemed “partisan selective exposure”
(Stroud, 2011) and refers to the tendency for partisans to select media content that is congruent
with their political beliefs. Thus, to avoid news that may present contradictory views, Democrats
now tend to self-select “liberal” media types like CNN whereas Republicans self-select
“conservative” media types like Fox News Channel (Feldman, 2011; Stroud, 2011).
Experimental evidence provides considerable support for partisan selective exposure,
finding that even non-political news stories are chosen based on the partisan slant of a news
source (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Major network news on ABC CBS and NBC may still gear
stories and advertising content toward ideologically moderate audiences, but with increasing
competition between networks, cable news and talk radio target specific types of news viewers–
i.e., political partisans. Cable channels and radio have thus created partisan “niche news” (Stroud,
2011) tailoring content to particular audience segments that enjoy consuming politically
agreeable news while avoiding broadcasts that may challenge their views.
Since at least 2003, the news agendas of cable television outlets have become
increasingly fragmented along partisan lines, providing biased patterns of coverage to political
events that, in turn, have lasting effects on audience perceptions and attitudes (Morris, 2005;
Stroud, 2011). Coverage of political scandal is not exempt from partisan biases (Entman, 2012;
Puglisi & Snyder, 2011). Officials are often incentivized to make allegations about
transgressions involving members of the opposition party in order to damage their reputation and
delimit their political power (Schudson, 2004; Thompson, 2000). Political outlets that report
through a partisan lens offer a ready platform for officials to make allegations abut opposition
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party members. As such, it is likely that liberal- or Democratic-leaning outlets (CNN) tend to
provide more frequent coverage to Republican scandals, while Republican-leaning outlets (Fox
News Channel) tend to provide more frequent coverage to Democratic scandals. Stated formally,
H4A: Republican-leaning cable television news outlets (Fox News Channel) will
provide more frequent coverage of scandals that affect Democratic officials.
H4B: Democratic-leaning cable television news outlets (CNN) will provide more
frequent coverage of scandals that affect Republican officials.
Partisan news outlets have their own news agendas that may indicate different patterns of
covering scandal (Stroud, 2011). Partisan differences in scandal coverage may, in turn, have real
world outcomes on audience perceptions. By downplaying likeminded partisan scandals, it is
possible that partisan news audiences come to perceive their own party as scandal-free, while
audiences view the opposition party as comprised only of crooks and sex fiends.
Individual Evaluations of Political Scandal
If an official can “survive” scandal publicity long enough to run for reelection, how do
voters judge the official’s transgressions? Does the public place more emphasis on punishing
officials accused of committing financial misconduct than those accused of sexual misbehavior?
There is growing scholarly debate about the effect of different types of scandals on public
opinion of elected officials (Doherty, Dowling, & Miller, 2011). On one hand, experimental
research demonstrates that the public is not overly punitive toward officials accused of sexual
transgressions such as extramarital affairs (Carlson, Ganiel, & Hyde, 2000; Funk, 1996; Sigal,
Hsu, Foodim, Betman, 1988), especially if the official is otherwise effective at their job and the
indiscretions do not invoke gender or racial stereotypes (Berinsky, Hutchings, Mendelberg,
Shaker, & Valentino, 2011; Carolson et al, 2000). Survey research, on the other hand,
demonstrates that financial and sex scandals produce equally negative public evaluations, or the
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reverse relationship (Brown, 2006; Peters & Welch, 1980; Welch & Hibbing, 1997). While it is
clear that all types of scandals can have deleterious effects on individual officials (Basinger,
2013; Dimock & Jacobson, 1995; Groseclose & Krehbiel, 1994; Jacobson & Dimock, 1994;
Praino, Stockemer, & Moscardelli, 2013; Welch & Hibbing, 1997), parties (Maier, 2011), and
institutions (Bowler & Karp, 2004), it remains uncertain whether voters punish officials accused
of sexual dalliances more harshly than members accused of financial misconduct.
Theoretically, a “rational” public would be able to account for the relatively high amount
of political and social damage that financial scandals create, punishing the accused severely.
Since sex scandals typically occur within the private sphere and affect a handful of individuals, a
rational public would likewise account for the minimal impact sex scandals have on an official’s
ability to govern, or on society in general. Indeed, previous research shows that the American
public tends to discount the private sexual dalliances of public officials, especially if the official
is otherwise effective (Lawrence & Bennett, 2001; Sonner & Wilcox, 1999).
There are, however, a multitude of other individual-level factors that may also influence
how voters evaluate officials accused of financial or sexual misconduct. First, the type of scandal
should influence evaluations of the accused. Experimental research shows that the public tends to
evaluate accusations of financial misconduct more harshly than “moral” or sexual violations
(Doherty et al., 2011; Sigal et al., 1988). In this way, it could be said that the public is “rational,”
possibly accounting for the magnitude of the scandal accusations when assessing the allegations.
Similarly, this study predicts that financial scandals will garner more negative ratings. Formally,
H5: Individuals will evaluate officials accused of financial misconduct more negatively
than officials accused of sexual misconduct.
The accused official’s party affiliation – Republican, Democrat, or some other party –
combined with the voters’ affiliation or ideological leanings should also affect how the
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transgression is judged. Humans are naturally predisposed to favor members of their group
(Brewer, 1979; Huddy, 2013; Tajfel 1982), even when those members are accused of committing
heinous actions (Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010). Likeminded partisans share a common
identity that binds them to each other (Huddy, 2013), and encourages a defensive posture toward
individuals who may threaten group norms. This is especially true among ideological
conservatives, who prize loyalty to the group as a chief moral virtue (Graham, Haidt & Nosek,
2009; Haidt, 2012). It is likely that partisans, or liberal-conservative ideologues, consider the
party identification of an official accused of scandal, with conservatives punishing Republican
officials less severely than Democratic officials and liberals the opposite. Formally,
H6A: Conservatives will evaluate a Democratic official accused of a scandal
more negatively than a Republican official accused of an identical scandal.
H6B: Liberals will evaluate a Republican official accused of a scandal more
negatively than a Democratic official accused of an identical scandal.
All else being equal, conservatives and liberals should protect members of their affiliated
groups, depositing highly negative evaluations on officials of the opposition party while
deflecting blame from a member of their group. Moral values associated with liberal and
conservative political ideology may also alter how voters evaluate accused officials. When voters
read scandal news, certain keyword cues may prompt them to think about and evaluate the
conduct in moral terms. When news audiences are exposed to a story about a wealthy
congressman accused of cheating on his taxes, for instance, their Fairness / Cheating moral value
may be primed, influencing how the individual evaluates the events, agents and actions described.
When audiences are exposed to a story about sexual misconduct, their Sanctity / Degradation
value may be activated, affecting evaluations of the sexual misconduct. Since liberals lean more
heavily on Fairness / Cheating when making moral judgments, and since conservatives rely more
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on Sanctity / Degradation, it is expected that conservatives will evaluate an official accused of a
sex scandal more negatively than an official accused of financial misconduct, whereas liberals
will deposit harsher punishments on officials accused of financial malfeasance. In other words,
the five basic moral foundations to which all human beings adhere (Graham et al., 2009), and
which are directly related to the ideological identities of political liberalism and conservatism
(Haidt, 2012), may shape individual evaluations of accused officials. Formally,
H7A: Conservatives will evaluate an official accused of a sex scandal more negatively
than will liberals.
H7B: Liberals will evaluate an official accused of a financial scandal more negatively
than will conservatives.
Liberals and conservatives rely on different ideologically motivated values when making
judgments. Conservatives care about fairness, but rely on that value less than liberals. Liberals
typically ignore or downplay concerns about bodily or sexual sanctity or degradation. After
accounting for the accused’s political party affiliation (Republican or Democrat), an interaction
between scandal type and participant ideology is expected to influence evaluations.
Finally, there is an expectation of an interaction between scandal type and a citizen’s
level of political knowledge. Political knowledge has been linked to articulating more consistent
and nuanced policy opinions (Sturgis & Smith, 2010), increased tolerance for minority political
groups (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), and being able to assign blame for bad policy to the
responsible officials (Gomez & Wilson, 2001). Individuals with high levels of political
knowledge may be able to comprehend the magnitude of a complex financial scheme and punish
officials accused of scandal more harshly than individual who score low in political knowledge.
Conversely, sex scandals are relatively easy-to-follow human dramas, making them
comprehensible to individuals at all levels of knowledge. There is an interactive expectation,
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then, between political knowledge and scandal type, such that political sophisticates exact
harsher punishments on officials accused of financial misbehavior and individuals with low
levels of political knowledge provide negative evaluations of those accused of sexual misconduct,
H8A: Individuals with high levels of political knowledge will evaluate officials accused
of financial scandals more negatively than will individuals who possess low levels of
political knowledge; the reverse will be true of sex scandals.
A competing expectation assumes that the magnitude of the consequences associated
with financial scandals is understandable at every level of political knowledge. However,
knowledge may bias processing of scandal information, such that the more knowledgeable the
citizen is, the more harshly they evaluate officials accused of trivial sexual misconduct. This
hypothesis is based on the logic that more sophisticated citizens are also more politically
engaged and receptive to political gamesmanship inherent in news messages. For instance,
Chong and Druckman (2007a; 2007b; see also Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013) find
evidence that knowledgeable individuals are more susceptible to partisan framing and cues in
news messages. This suggests that while high levels of political knowledge may have a number
of desirable byproducts, such as increased tolerance for minority groups in society (Delli Carpini
& Keeter, 1996), high levels of knowledge may also bias individuals to think about the game of
politics rather than the substance. In a scandal scenario, we would thus expect,
H8B: Individuals with high levels of political knowledge will evaluate officials accused
of sexual scandals more negatively than will individuals who possess low levels of
political knowledge; the reverse will be true of financial scandals.
The world of politics attracts individuals of all stripes, of all creeds and levels of
sophistication. It is clear that individuals who are knowledgeable about politics are better able to
understand the implications of national events and the inner workings of government, are better
able to recognize the scope of their duties as democratic citizens, and are more sophisticated in
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assigning policy credit (and blame) where it is due. Based on this logic, we might expect that
knowledgeable citizens punish officials accused of financial scandals more harshly than officials
accused of relatively sexual misbehavior. Yet having a vast store of political knowledge is not
without its drawbacks. Knowledgeable individuals are more susceptible to biased processing of
partisan messages. In a scandal scenario, knowledgeable individuals may therefore exact harsher
punishments on relatively trivial sex scandals than will their low-knowledge counterparts.
Political Scandals and Electoral Survivability
Given the idea that news media pay differing amounts of attention to financial and sexual
scandals, how do patterns of press coverage influence electoral outcomes? Several empirical
studies have examined factors that affect a political official’s electoral “survivability” after
scandal accusations are made, focusing on the impact of press coverage. For example, Herrick
(2000) found that the frequency of Washington Post stories mentioning a U.S. House scandal
related negatively to House member being reelected. The more frequently a scandal was
mentioned, the higher the probability of a House member’s electoral defeat. Shea (1999) found
that the frequency of local news stories about a scandal adversely impacted a congressman’s
electoral survivability. Since the public relies on the media to tell them “what to think about”
(Cohen, 1963; McCombs, 2004; Mccombs & Shaw, 1972), increased scandal coverage should
have deleterious effects on a political official’s post-scandal electoral fortunes, assuming that all
scandal coverage acts as negative publicity for the member accused. Formally,
H9A: Frequency of scandal coverage will relate positively to losing reelection.
H9B: Frequency of scandal coverage will relate positively to resigning office.
It is also plausible that the type of scandal, financial or sexual in nature, interacts with
press coverage. Sexual scandals like that of former Representative Anthony Weiner engender

19

intense media scrutiny. In the case of Weiner, House minority leader Nancy Pelosi called on the
disgraced congressman to resign (Hernandez, 2011). Similar evidence suggests party leadership
asked former representatives Mark Foley (Halloran, 2011), Gary Condit (Standora, 2001), and
Eric Massa (Benjamin & McAuliff, 2010) to resign in the wake of a sex scandal. In each case,
the ensuing media firestorm resulted in party leadership calling on the representative to resign or
retire from office, which they inevitably did rather than distract from their party’s agenda.
Since for-profit media norms and routines presumably oblige the press to pay more
attention to sexual scandals than to financial scandals, there is an expectation that sex scandals
will also result in higher resignation rates than will financial scandals. Sex scandals may receive
such intense press coverage that accused members often have to step aside rather than distract
from their party’s policymaking and governing agendas. An interactive relationship between
scandal type and frequency of press coverage is thus predicted. Specifically,
H10: The effect of press coverage on resignations from office will be greater for officials
accused of sexual misconduct than for officials accused of financial misconduct.
Importantly, high rates of electoral defeat stemming from a sex scandal are not
hypothesized to emerge from a voting bloc that makes a post-scandal election a referendum on
an official’s sexual affairs. Accusations of sex scandal should result in higher rates of resignation
because members face intense media scrutiny, and are subsequently pressured by party
leadership to resign. The press and party leadership, not voters, decide the fortunes of an official
accused of sexual misconduct, whereas financial misconduct is usually decided at the ballot box.
Summary
The press controls the “pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 1997). Issues that are covered
frequently in the media become the issues we think about (Cohen, 1963), through the press-topublic transfer of issue importance (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2004). In this sense,
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the press can wield tremendous power over the symbolic political resources of reputation and
trust. The press can improve or damage an official’s image, with scandal publicity often
threatening to limit the accused’s political capital (Marion, 2010; Schudson, 2004; Thompson,
2000), and degrade the image and policymaking capability of the associated party.
In a democracy, the press also functions as an intermediary political institution, a “Fourth
Branch” of government that scrutinizes government activity, including government corruption
and scandal (Cook, 1998; 2005; Schudson, 1981; 2011). The press plays a vital role in
communicating information about government malfeasance to the public, so that voters have the
necessary evidence to forgive and reelect or “vote the bastards out” during the next season. If the
press is not “properly calibrated” (Entman, 2012) to the severity of political scandal, however,
the result may be an overemphasis on trivial but entertaining sex scandals rather than grave
abuses of power for personal financial advancement. Extramarital sexual dalliances like that of
Anthony Weiner’s online escapades may dominate the news agenda, while theft, bribery and
extortion garner relatively less press attention. In essence, this chapter suggests that patterns of
news coverage may make it “safer” for a politician to steal from his own constituents than to
“score” sexual favors. The former type of misconduct garners relatively less attention from the
national media compared to sexual misconduct that titillates and amuses (Schudson, 2004).
Chapter 2 analyzes over five years of scandal news coded by Pew Research and made
available through the News Coverage Index (NCI) database. This chapter investigates the
possibility that media give more coverage to sex scandals relative to financial scandals. Scandals
involving congressional officials in the Legislative branch are considered. Partisan biases in
reporting among cable television news network (CNN and Fox News Channel) are also
considered as a factor that may influence variation in frequency of scandal coverage.
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In Chapter 3, a survey-based experiment examines individual-level factors that shape
evaluations of officials accused of engaging in financial or sexual scandals. Using a 2
(Republican / Democratic) X 2 (financial / sex scandal) experimental design, this chapter isolates
the individual impact of party affiliation and scandal type on evaluations of the accused.
Additionally, this chapter considers the effects of participant ideology and knowledge on
judgments. Since humans tend to favor members of their social group, it is hypothesized that
conservatives will tend to give more negative evaluations of Democrats accused of a scandal.
Chapter 4 provides an additional test of differences in financial and sex scandal coverage
over a longer period of time. This chapter uses data aggregated on members of the U.S. House of
Representatives from 1996 to 2012, analyzing the effect of media scrutiny on electoral outcomes.
The interactive influence of media attention and scandal type – financial or sexual – on the
probability the representative resigns, loses reelection or wins reelection is assessed.
This study concludes by summarizing results in Chapter 5. Here, the study provides
theoretical implications for citizens and political parties, and practical recommendations for news
media organizations and journalists. Democracy depends on a press that’s “properly calibrated”
to government malfeasance in order to survive. The sexual transgressions of our officials may be
overlooked as long as they are still able to perform their jobs as elected representatives. And
while it may be true that “the press is in the news business, not the business of politics”
(Patterson, 1994, p. 36), the press’ adopted role as government watchdog suggests that
journalists should take an active role in accounting for the severity of scandal claims before
reporting. The press has incentives to ignore or downplay partisan claims about sex scandals like
extramarital affairs, especially if such scandals do not violate the law or involve abuses of power.
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CHAPTER 2. PRESS COVERAGE

Introduction
Every word of news, whether written or spoken, is shaped by a multitude of political,
economic and institutional forces. Although political biases can certainly color press accounts of
scandal (Pugilisi & Snyder, 2011), scandal news is not simply result of partisan chicanery.
The news is also a “product” or “commodity” that audiences purchase (Hamilton, 2004;
McManus, 1994; 1995). News topics that audiences find desirable are generally topics that news
producers find desirable; journalists and editors understandably want to retain and grow their
audience base. It is no wonder then, that the press to a certain extent allows audience demand to
influence its coverage. Since the press is a business, it has incentive to give audiences interesting
and colorful content in order to attract even larger audiences. Expanding audiences, younger
audiences in particular, increase sales of news products such as newspaper or online news
subscriptions, simultaneously increasing the likelihood that advertisers will buy column inches or
broadcast time that reaches very large, very desirable consumer demographics (Hamilton, 2004).
Since news is intended to be pleasurable to watch or read, it often focuses on
entertainment or “soft news” involving political gamesmanship (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996;
Fallows, 1997) and titillating scandals (Schudson, 2004), just as much or more so than hardhitting public affairs (McManus, 1994; 1995). The press is, at least in part, a commercial entity
that lives and dies by the audience’s hand. For it to be an organ of democracy, providing crucial
political information to citizens, it needs first to survive economically. If it comes down to an
editorial choice between reporting salacious news about a politician’s sex life or relatively bland
information about financial malfeasance, journalists are incentivized to err on the side of
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entertaining their audience rather than putting them to sleep. Sex scandals typically involve
entertaining, provocative narratives, whereas the dry facts of financial scandals are often dull.
Moreover, the kind of “human drama” commonly involved in a political sex scandal is
easy for both journalists and audiences to understand. Everyone who was alive at the time still
remembers to whom “Monica” and to what the “blue dress” refers. These terms entered public
discourse by way of a highly publicized affair between former Democratic President Bill Clinton
and intern Monica Lewinsky, an affair that drew around-the-clock media attention for the better
part of 1998. This real-life political drama was a compelling story about a man who lived the
American Dream, rising up from his humble beginnings in rural Arkansas to become the leader
of the free world, only to have a successful career torn asunder by accusations of impropriety.
Audiences may have puzzled over the political risk involved in the affair, yet Clinton’s public
approval ratings remained strong after the scandal was revealed (Zaller, 1998), suggesting that
audiences could understand and were willing to forgive Clinton’s very basic human failing as
well as his desire to keep his sexual affairs private. The Lewsinky scandal was easy for
audiences to grasp because it involved only a handful of actors – Clinton, his wife, and Lewinsky
– and described an interpersonal relationship as old as human sexuality itself.
Contrast coverage of sex scandals like Clinton’s with financial corruption. Does the
average citizen – or journalist, for that matter – comprehend the financial transactions that
occurred between former lobbyist Jack Abramoff, former Republican Representative John
Doolittle and other relevant members of Congress? Even though the Abramoff scandal first made
national media attention seven years after the Lewinsky affair, in 2005, it is likely that those
alive at the time remember relatively fewer details about that scandal than the Lewinsky affair.
Why? Its details of conspiracy and financial fraud may simply be too complex compared to the
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Lewinsky scandal, in which two words, “blue dress,” can summarize the thrust of the event.
Sexual scandals are easy for journalists and audiences to understand, and should therefore garner
more coverage than scandal involving the complexities of campaign finance or the tax code.
Routine, institutional factors also influence the daily headlines and the amount of
coverage a particular event, such as a political scandal, receives. First, it is widely understood
that official sources drive press coverage. News media producers, including journalists and
editors, have working relationships with political officials, exchanging the opportunity for
publicity for the opportunity to get the inside scoop on the latest political dealings (Cook, 1996;
2005). In this way, the news media is a kind of “Fourth Branch” of American government, acting
as an intermediary institution between the other branches. Political information about all three
branches – Executive, Legislative and Judicial – flow through the press, between braches, and to
the public. The flow of information involves the regular practice of journalists relying on
political officials for their political content. Political scandals, in this way, are often dependent
on statements by both likeminded officials and members of the opposition party. Indeed, as
Enmtan (2012) suggests, opposition party officials often keep scandals alive, making additional
allegations and revelations that keeps the press interested in pursuing misconduct.
Since news media producers rely on official statements for news content, this also implies
that any scandal involving a high-ranking official who has a pre-established working relationship
with journalists – especially the President of the United States and officials from the Executive
Branch – may receive relatively more coverage than scandals involving U.S. state officials who
may not have regular access to national media. The president commands national media attention.
As such, there is an expectation that any scandal affecting the Executive branch should garner
more coverage than scandals involving, for instance, state governors. Journalists also have
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working relationships with members of Congress, especially high-ranking party leaders.
Therefore, news media should give more attention to scandals involving members of Congress
than to scandals involving state officials. All news media relies on official statements, such as
press releases, to motivate political coverage. This routine also pertains to scandal coverage.
Journalistic reliance on official sources should also decrease scandal coverage in cases of
speedy resignations from office, i.e., resignations that occur within two weeks of the initial
revelations. One purpose of making an official statement about a scandal is to generate news
coverage that will damage the symbolic power of the opposition party, including its members’
reputation and trust (Entman, 2012; Thompson, 2000). When the accused official(s) resign their
political positions quickly, they remove all vestiges of substantive or symbolic power.
Consequently, scandal coverage should die down. The news is constrained, in part, by official
sources. And when an accused official resigns from office, the original purpose of releasing
information about a scandal – to damage the official – is removed from the equation.
Finally, institutional factors associated with the medium through which news is
disseminated also shape press coverage. The “slow” and “logical” medium of printed
newspapers and its limited daily “newshole” forces editors to eliminate pure entertainment
content to make room for more hard-hitting public affairs news (Hamilton, 2004). Meanwhile,
the 24/7 nature of cable and radio news, and the potentially infinite newshole of online news
channels allow for more coverage of entertainment-driven politics. The nature of the medium, in
the case of cable, radio and online news, suggests an opportunity to provide additional coverage
of entertaining politics, specifically, scandal. Compared to print newspapers, cable television,
radio and online news outlets should give more attention to any type of political scandal.
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There is also the consideration of press agenda “congestion” (Boydstun, 2013; Nyhan,
2014). At a given moment, the press has a range of official political news it can choose to
publicize. When congress is in session, for instance, the number of official political statements
increases. During the summer, when congress is adjourned and the president is vacationing, there
is little noteworthy political activity unless a national emergency sparks urgent coverage.
Weekends and holidays are also periods of decreased political activity, as are particular days of
the week (e.g., Fridays) when relatively less official business transpires. For these reasons, there
are fairly predictable daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal shocks to the media agenda. One week
the national news agenda may be to “congested” to discuss what amount to an official’s trivial
sexual liaisons. During an uneventful summer, a relatively trivial sex scandal may be blown up
into Watergate proportions. For these reasons, it is also expected that day in which a scandal first
gains national attention should alter how the intensity of press response.
Method
Data
To assess differences in press coverage of financial and sexual scandals, this study
combined publicly available news coverage data from the Pew Research Center’s News
Coverage Index (NCI) with aggregated data on each scandal mentioned in the NCI. The NCI is
an ongoing content analysis of news coverage that started Jan. 1, 2007 and was available through
May 31, 2012. Pew’s unit of analysis was the news story. Fourteen trained Pew coders coded
news stories, with a calculated percent agreement of 100% for story date, 96% for source, and
87% agreement for “big story” topic. While a simple percent agreement reliability statistic does
not take into account random coder agreement (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005), the percentages for
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the primary variables were high enough, and the conceptualization of variables (e.g., story date)
were reasonably clear enough that little random error in story codes should theoretically exist.
Pew administrators selected news stories for coding using a multistage purposive
sampling method. According to Pew, this method was employed “because of differences in
measuring systems across media” (Pew, 2012). Random sampling from a diverse array of media
content would not account for the number of news outlets in a given sector (e.g., cable TV news),
the amount of news programming in each outlet, or audience reach. It would also fail to account
for medium-specific variation in story length; for instance, word counts in a print article or a
cable news transcript. Thus, all NCI data are selected and weighted to account for variation in
formats, and potential audience reach across mediums (Pew, 2012).
This study used an inductive method to identify and select scandal cases from the Pew
NCI. For scandal cases to be included in this analysis, each scandal event had to meet several
criteria. First, the scandal had to be available in the Pew data, meaning that it had to have
occurred between January 1, 2007 and May 31, 2012. Scandals occurring before 2007 or after
May 2012 were not included in the analysis. Second, scandal coverage had to affect a prominent
political figure, including a member of, or someone directly linked to members of the Executive,
Legislative or Judicial branches, or a state governor. While covered heavily, “celebrity scandals”
or controversies such as the Jerry Sandusky Penn State child sex abuse case were not included in
the analysis since these cases did not directly relate to politics. Finally, the scandal had to refer to
a financial or sexual transgression. Scandals that referred to a breach of sexual mores, such as the
disclosure that former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer hired prostitutes were considered “sex
scandals.” Events that described immoral or illegal financial conduct, such as former Louisiana
Representative William Jefferson’s bribery case, were considered examples of “financial
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scandals.” Using this method, the analysis discovered (n = 27) scandal scenarios with (n = 4,157)
related stories in the Pew NCI. Appendix A shows a full list of scandals included in the analysis.
Measures. Control Variables. Several dummy variables were included in the analysis,
to account for aspects of the scandal scenarios, including the behavior of the accused, as well as
the political and media contexts. First, a dummy variable was created assessing whether the
official(s) accused resigned within two weeks of the scandal revelations. Approximately 18.52%
of scandals in the analysis involved officials who resigned within two weeks of receiving
national attention. It is notable that all of these resignations were sex scandals involving a
member of Congress (e.g., former Democratic Representative Eric Massa). A continuous control
variable called duration assessed the number of years the scandal appeared in Pew NCI coverage
(M = 1.11, SD = 0.22, range = 0 to 4). The majority of scandal events (37.04%) lasted less than
one year. A dummy variable called Republican was used to assess whether scandal stories
affected mainly Democratic (59.26%) or Republican officials (40.74%). Another dummy control
variable assessed whether the scandal involved a misdemeanor or felony criminal offense
(22.22% involved a criminal offense). A dummy variable was also used to control for whether
the accused official conducted proactive publicity in defense of their conduct (3.70%). Only in
the case of Rod Blagojevich’s bribery scandal did officials engage in proactive defense of their
conduct. This meant that officials sought media publicity in order to defend their actions.
Independent Variable. The primary independent variable was the type of political
referred to, financial (40.74%) or sexual (59.26%). This variable was labeled financial scandal in
subsequent modeling procedures, with financial scandals coded high and sex scandals coded low.
Scandals were considered primarily “financial” in nature if they involved unethical activities
surrounding public monies or the use of power to obtain or transfer personal monies, and “sexual”
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if they referred to any kind of socially deviant sexual conduct. For example, the “D.C. madam”
scandal involved congressmen hiring prostitutes, presumably with sexual intent in mind.
Dependent Variable. A count of scandal news stories was the primary outcome variable.
This variable measured the raw frequency of news stories in the Pew NCI pertaining to financial
(M = 189.64, SD = 369.78) and sexual scandals (M = 129.44, SD = 138.69). This variable was
heavily skewed (X2 = 32.34, p<.001), suggesting the need for non-linear modeling techniques.
Procedure. The first goal of the analysis was to determine whether cases of financial or
sexual misconduct receive differential press coverage, controlling for variables that may
influence the relationship between scandal type and press attention. Due to the dependent
variable being comprised of count data and being positively skewed, the appropriate statistical
modeling procedure was a Poisson regression (Long & Freese, 2006). This procedure assumes
that the dependent variable cannot take on negative or non-integer values. Data are assumed to
be raw counts of a particular phenomenon, in this case, counts of news stories. All negative
binomial coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a one-unit change in the predictor variable
resulting in a B unit change in the difference in the logs of the expected counts of the dependent
variable, holding all other variables in the model constant (Long & Freese, 2006).
Additionally, it should be noted that standard errors were clustered by the year the
scandal appeared in the Pew NCI, to eliminate any temporal effects on the dependent story count
variable. The primary concern here was to eliminate any changes in the media or political
environments that could have occurred between the years 2007 to 2012, including increasing
cable TV news and Internet penetration among the American population, the decline of
newsroom budgets especially among “hard news” sources such as print newspapers, the rise of
tablet computers as a news delivery mechanism, and changes in party leadership among the
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branches of federal government (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Boydstun, 2013; Hamilton, 2004;
Patterson, 2013). Any of these changes may influence relationships analyzed in the model, and
thus, clustering standard errors by year the scandal began was a necessary precaution.
A second, exploratory analysis examined how different media sectors and outlets covered
scandals at the story level (n = 4,157). This analysis used only Pew NCI data and raw counts of
scandals stories as the dependent variable. Media sector – newspapers, radio, network TV, cable
TV, and online news outlets – and outlet (e.g., Fox News Channel, CNN) were used as the
independent variables. Here the goal was to determine simple differences in scandal coverage by
sector and outlet, determining whether media sector and partisan bias drove patterns of overall
coverage. Since news tends to follow seasonal patterns, with the news agenda “congested”
during some periods and not others, this analysis assessed scandal coverage by year.
Results
Effect of Scandal Type. This chapter hypothesized that qualitative differences among
political scandals would affect media coverage. Specifically, it was predicted that sexual
scandals would garner more media attention than financial scandals (H1). The Poisson regression
model shown in Table 1 provides evidence in support of HI. The results shown in Table 1
suggest that sexual scandals garnered more coverage than did financial scandals (b =-1.06, SE =
0.31, p<.001). Indeed, the rate of story counts decreases by 85.81 going from the average sex
scandal to the average financial scandal, with all other variables in the model held constant.
A number of other control variables were strong predictors of scandal news coverage.
Official resignations within two weeks of scandal revelations related to fewer stories being
published about a scandal (b =-2.05, SE = 0.52, p<.001). Scandals reflecting on members of the
Judicial Branch also generated less coverage than gubernatorial scandals in the excluded baseline
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category (b =-1.86, SE = 0.28, p<.05). Scandals generated more news coverage the more years
they were covered (b =-1.86, SE = 0.28, p<.001), if they involved a criminal misdemeanor or
felony charge (b =0.53, SE = 0.21, p<.05) and if the accused official actively sought scandal
publicity (b =1.75, SE = 0.44, p<.001), as was the case with former Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich, who conducted an aggressive PR campaign to address claims of bribery.
Table 1.
Poisson Regression Predicting Frequency of Scandal News Stories
b
(SE)

z

95% CI
Lower
Upper

Financial Scandal

-1.05
(0.38)

-2.75

-1.81

-0.30

0.01

-85.81

Resign in < Two Weeks

-1.81
(0.53)

-3.44

-2.84

-0.78

0.00

-110.02

Duration

0.27
(0.11)

2.43

0.05

0.50

0.02

78.35

Republican

-0.20
(0.40)

-0.51

-0.98

0.57

0.61

-22.68

Criminal

0.58
(0.25)

2.32

0.09

1.06

0.02

52.70

Proactive Publicity

1.70
(0.38)

4.42

0.94

2.45

0.00

382.65

Constant

4.85
(0.34)

14.32

4.18

5.51

0.00

N
PRE

p

Min-->Max

---

27
75.90%

Note: Standard errors are clustered by the year the scandal first made national media attention to
mitigate extraneous temporal effects. The model’s proportional reduction in error (PRE) of
75.90% suggests that the model explained a considerable amount of variation in the outcome
variable, above and beyond a model without independent variables entered. A two-tailed t-test
also showed a significant effect of the scandal type variable and stories with scandal mentions.
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
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Coverage by Media Sector. H2A and H2B predicted that newspapers and radio would
pay more attention to financial scandals (H2A), whereas online news, network television news,
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and cable television news would pay more attention to sex scandal (H2B).
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Figure 2.
Frequency of Financial and Sexual Scandal Stories by Media Sector
Note: Frequencies derived from Pew News Coverage Index (NCI), covering 27 cases of political
scandal and 4,157 stories from Jan. 1 2007 to May 31 2012. A similar figure using proportions of
stories produced a highly similar pattern of results.
There is partial evidence to support each hypothesis. Figure 2 shows raw frequencies of
sexual and financial scandal coverage across five media sectors. A series of one-tailed t-tests
were used to determine differences in the proportion of coverage a medium (e.g., cable TV)
gives to a particular type of scandal. A one-tailed t-test revealed that radio news outlets did
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provide more attention to financial political scandals than sex scandals t(4,155) = -1.77, p<.05.
Counter to the prediction, there was no difference in how newspapers covered financial and
sexual scandals (p = 0.37). H2A is partially supported.
The result also show that online news t(4,155) = 1.66, p<.05 and network television
outlets t(4,155) = 1.49, p<.10 provided more frequent coverage of sex scandals than financial
scandals. Counter to the prediction, there was no significant difference in how cable television
news covered financial and sexual scandals (p = 0.80). H2B receives partial support.
Coverage by Media Sources. Financial scandals should receive more frequent coverage
from sources that specialize in disseminating financial information and substantive public affairs
news (H3A). Sources like The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the PBS Newshour
with Jim Lehrer, and National Public Radio news programs like Morning Edition should pay
more attention to official financial misconduct than sex scandals. These outlets tent to cater to
older, high-income audiences that seek “hard news” about elections, public policy, and foreign
affairs (Hamilton, 2004). Moreover, the ample newsroom budgets of the Times and Journal may
provide enhanced opportunity to do original investigative reporting into the complex,
bureaucratic world of official financial misconduct. PBS and NPR, being non-profit media
organizations, should not have a profit-seeking motive to frequently report about salacious
sexual misbehavior. As predicted, hard news sources like NPR’s Morning Edition and Talk of
the Nation provide more coverage to financial scandals than sex scandals (see Figure 3).
A series of one-tailed t-tests comparing the proportion of financial and sexual scandal
stories each source provided demonstrates a prevailing focus on financial scandals among “hard
news” outlets. The PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer t(4,155) = -3.71, p<.001 and NPR’s Morning
Edition and Talk of the Nation t(4,155) = -3.46, p<.001 both provided more coverage of financial
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scandals than sex scandals, supporting H3A. Counter to the hypothesis, one-tailed t-tests
revealed that The New York Times (p = 0.55) and The Wall Street Journal (p = 0.32) provided
roughly equal amounts of coverage to financial and sex scandals. One potential explanation for
these divergent findings is that the lack of a profit motive allows NPR and PBS to focus on
“boring” and detailed cases of financial misconduct, while The Times and The Journal’s profit-
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seeking structure still motivates coverage to appeal to consumer demand for sensational stories.
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Figure 3.
Frequency of Financial and Sexual Scandal Stories by “Hard News” Source
Note: Frequencies derived from Pew News Coverage Index (NCI), covering 27 cases of political
scandal and 4,157 stories from Jan. 1 2007 to May 31 2012.
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If “hard news” sources like The Wall Street Journal give roughly equal attention to sexual
and financial misconduct, how do purely “soft news” sources such as NBC’s The Today Show
handle scandal coverage? It was predicted that sex scandals should be particularly appealing
fodder for “soft news” sources like NBC’s The Today Show, CBS’s The Early Show, ABC’s
Good Morning America, and The Huffington Post news website (H3B).
Sources like The Today Show have substantial news holes that they must fill with
original and entertaining programming to attract audiences and maintain ratings (Hamilton,
2004). Often this leads to a focus on provocative and sensational stories about crime, celebrities,
gossip and scandal (Patterson, 2013). These “soft news” sources have little incentive to cover
substantial government corruption and financial misconduct. Instead, they must provide more
infotainment, or entertaining news programming, in order to compete for audience attention
among other news outlets and pure entertainment sources such as made-for-TV movies, fiction,
online porn, video games and so forth (Fallows, 1997; McChesney, 2004; Patterson, 2013). With
so many alternative sources of entertainment vying for audience attention, “soft news” sources
must constantly focus on sensational stories, particularly sex scandals to bring in viewers.
As shown in Figure 4, all four “soft news” sources gave more overall coverage to cases
of political sexual misconduct than financial misconduct. The evidence supports H3B. A series
of one-tailed t-tests were conducted to determine differences in financial and sexual scandal
coverage by source. The t-tests showed significantly more sex scandal coverage by The Today
Show t(4,155) = 2.21, p<.05, The Early Show t(4,155) = p<.10, Good Morning America t(4,155)
= 3.58, p<.001, and The Huffington Post news website t(4,155) = 2.69, p<.01. Across all sources,
sex scandals were given more overall attention than financial scandals. An alternative figure
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using the proportion of all stories covered revealed a similar pattern of findings. Across each soft
news outlet, sex scandal coverage far outpaces coverage of financial scandals.
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Figure 4.
Frequency of Financial and Sexual Scandal Stories by “Soft News” Source
Note: Frequencies derived from Pew News Coverage Index (NCI), covering 27 cases of political
scandal and 4,157 stories from Jan. 1 2007 to May 31 2012.
Partisan Coverage. A prevailing characteristic of the cable TV news environment is that
there is partisan bias in coverage (Feldman, 2011; Morris, 2005; 2007; Stroud, 2011). Due to the
editorial slant of particular cable TV news outlets, coverage of ordinary political events becomes
distorted, interpreted through the partisan lens of the outlet’s producers, reporters, and anchors.
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Figure 5.
Proportion of CNN and Fox News Stories about Scandal
Note: The heavy blue line represents the proportion of CNN stories about the Larry Craig sex
scandal and the proportion of CNN stories about the Solyndra scandal. The heavy blue line
represents the proportion of Fox News stories about the Larry Craig sex scandal and the
proportion of Fox News stories about the Solyndra scandal. The X-axis represents time – Aug.
2007 to Oct. 2007 (Craig), Sep. 2011 to Jan. 2012 (Solyndra).
A one-tailed t-test was conducted to compare how partisan cable outlets cover
Democratic and Republican scandals. This test assessed mean differences in Republican and
Democratic scandal stories broadcast by Fox News Channel and CNN (n = 1,166). Assuming
that Fox typically represents a conservative Republican viewpoint and CNN is more likely to
provide a liberal Democratic viewpoint (Feldman, 2011; Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2008; 2011), the
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prediction is that Fox will pay more attention to scandals that may reflect poorly on Democrats
(H4A), and CNN will pay more attention to scandals reflecting poorly on Republicans (H4B).
The results show support for H4A and H4B. A one-tailed t-test shows a significant
difference in scandal stories t(1,164) = 3.42, p<.001, with CNN providing more coverage (M =
0.31, SD = 0.46) to Republican scandals than Fox (M = 0.22, SD = 0.41). This test also suggests
the inverse, that CNN paid less attention to Democratic scandals (M = 0.69, SD = 0.46) than did
Fox News (M = 0.78, SD = 0.41). The results suggest that there is partisan bias in scandal
coverage, with opposition officials receiving more scandal news than likeminded officials.
Two cases that illustrate partisan bias in scandal coverage are represented in Figure 5.
This figure shows the proportion of all CNN and Fox News stories that specifically discussed
former Republican Senator Larry Craig’s sex scandal and the Solyndra controversy plaguing the
Democratic administration of President Obama. When the scandal hurt Republicans (Larry
Craig), the blue trend line representing CNN scandal stories outpaces the red trend line
representing Fox stories. The reverse is true of scandals that hurt Democrats (Solyndra).
In the case of Larry Craig, who was arrested for soliciting sex in an Idaho airport men’s
room (New York Times, 2007), CNN provided an initial surge of coverage followed by sporadic
attention in the succeeding months. Fox downplayed the Craig scandal relative to CNN,
providing fewer initial stories and lighter coverage long term. The Solyndra controversy, which
involved a possibly illegal government restructuring of a $535 million loan to the Solyndra solar
energy company (Stephens & Leonnig, 2011), demonstrated an opposite pattern. CNN paid little
attention to Solyndra relative to Fox, who kept the story alive with continuing coverage.
It is also notable that the initial coverage of the Larry Craig sex scandal was more intense
than the initial coverage of Solyndra. While many other factors relating to time and “agenda
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congestion” could influence how intensely a particular topic receives initial coverage (Boydstun,
2013; Nyhan, 2014), the graphs illustrated in Figure 5 show CNN and Fox paying more attention
to a provocative, high profile sex scandal than an equally high profile financial controversy.
Discussion
Press coverage of political scandal does not appear, “properly calibrated” (Entman, 2012,
p. 2) to the severity of the allegations. Financial scandals can do considerable damage to the
public’s trust in government, creating doubt about the honesty of officials, and possibly
generating legal complications. The majority of official sexual indiscretions are private matters
that do little harm to the daily business of government, or to society, excepting any illegal sexual
activity. Why then, does the press give more attention, on average, to relatively trivial political
sex scandals, while dubious financial dealings of national officials are downplayed?
One answer explored in this chapter focuses on the role of media incentives and
institutional routines. Perhaps the most crucial set of incentives discussed in this study are
economic: the desire of a news organization to make profits by using entertaining and salacious
political scandal news to increase audience size and sell advertising (Hamilton, 2004). Since sex
scandals often involve simple and provocative narratives, the journalistic community may view
them as low-hanging fruit. In a world of intense market competition and shrinking news budgets
(Arnold, 2006), a sex scandal may represent an easy opportunity to generate more audience
interest in news products, resulting in increases in advertising revenues. Consistent with
Patterson (1994, p. 36), it appears that, in the case of political scandal, the norms of the news
business may be at odds with the norms of politics. While financial scandals often violate
democratic, ethical and legal norms, they are usually given less media attention than are sex
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scandals (H1). The implication is that the news media does not weigh carefully normative
concerns about scandal typology when deciding how much attention a transgression receives.
In fact, it appears that the press may place economic incentives and institutional routines
before democratic values. With declining newsroom budgets and fewer personnel, news
organizations may place more stock in covering provocative stories about sex scandals, stories
that receive and sustain audience attention. Simultaneously, the press may be increasingly unable,
or unwilling, to invest dwindling resources in the probing of more complex financial scandals. At
the end of the day, it instead may simply be more cost effective and convenient to allow officials
to release statements disclosing scandal details, and to write scandal news based off of official
statements. As long as officials are making statements about a scandal, institutional routines
demand coverage. It appears the one effective way at mitigating coverage is for an official to
resign quickly. Scandal coverage is driven in part by the media’s institutional routines, routines
that also be leveraged to eliminate coverage. Nevertheless, resigning an official position is
tantamount to electoral defeat, and represents the loss of both substantive and symbolic power.
Patterns of scandal news coverage are influenced by news media sector. Radio outlets
tend to focus more on financial scandals than sexual scandals (H2A), while online and network
television news mediums provide more coverage to sexual misconduct relative to financial
malfeasance (H2B). It is plausible that the format of mediums like radio that do not rely on
visuals, are able to provide more in-depth coverage of financial scandals. Oddly, and counter to
the hypotheses, major print newspapers that tend to focus on “hard news” and cable television
networks that tend to focus on “soft news” paid roughly equal attention to sexual and financial
scandal. It is possible that some news sources within each media sector alter these broad patterns.
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This study analyzed four “hard news” sources and four “soft news” sources for evidence
of differential sexual and financial scandal coverage. While The New York Times and The Wall
Street Journal provided equal amounts of attention to sexual and financial scandals, the PBS
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and NPR’s Morning Edition and Talk of the Nation provided gave
more coverage to financial scandals (H3A). One explanation for this may be that PBS and NPR
are non-profit media organizations. There is less motivation for PBS and NPR to increase
audience attention (and advertising revenues) by promoting salacious sex scandals. H3B
predicted that “soft news” sources would provide more attention to controversial and provocative
sexual misconduct than the relatively complex and bureaucratic financial scandal scenario. This
hypothesis was supported. The Today Show, The Early Show, Good Morning America, and The
Huffington Post news website all provided more attention to sexual misbehavior than the
financial misdeeds of elected officials. This does not imply that the sources ignored breaking
events surrounding financial scandal. It does suggest that financial scandals may be viewed as
less newsworthy or less appealing by editors, producers, or reporters at these particular outlets.
Partisan calculations also influence patterns of scandal news coverage (H4A and H4B).
Human beings are motivated to protect members of their social (Tajfel, 1982) and political
groups (Huddy, 2013), and previous research shows evidence of partisan bias in news coverage
(Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2011), in particular, newspaper coverage of political scandal (Pugilisi &
Snyder, 2011). Consistent with previous research, this chapter demonstrates a partisan
mechanism in cable TV news coverage, with conservative-leaning Fox News providing
relatively more attention to scandals that may damage the reputation of liberal and Democratic
officials. The same partisan bias was found with regard to CNN, the liberal-leaning news outlet.
CNN paid more attention to scandals that may harm the reputations of Republican officials.
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There are at least two ramifications of the partisan nature of scandal coverage,
demonstrated by Fox and CNN. First, partisan coverage may engender biased perceptions of, and
memories about, political reality (Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2011). Individuals who only watch Fox,
in this case, may come away from programming believing that the Republican Party is relatively
scandal-free, while the Democrats are swindlers and sex fiends. CNN viewers may hold a reverse
pattern of impressions about officials. Additionally, partisan coverage may enhance partisan
polarization among citizens. Accusations hurled at members of the opposition party may
reinforce a perception that opposition party members are “others” or outsiders that are not part of
their own political group (Tafjel, 1982; Huddy, 2013), possibly delegitimizing their power or
their perceived right to govern. In either event, partisan influences on scandal coverage may have
real-world effects that lead to miscalculated punishments at the ballot box, distorted partisan
perceptions and increased polarization. Future research could explore the impact of partisan
scandal coverage on perceptions, polarization and voter turnout in national elections.
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CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL EVALUATIONS

Introduction
The world of politics is distant and the halls of power remote. Average citizens receive
only fleeting glimpses of national and international political events, mostly through news media.
Accordingly, the press holds considerable sway over a citizen’s view of political reality (see
Lippmann, 1997). Scandal information, for instance, is not brought to the citizen raw and
undigested, but is rather filtered through the gatekeeping processes of the press, with journalists
and editors deciding the words, phrases and structure belonging to political scandal narratives.
The manner and frequency in which news reports political scandals may, in turn, have real
effects on audience evaluations of the accused, possibly leading to electoral defeat, distraction
from party goals, and the mitigation or elimination of the symbolic power of reputation and
trustworthiness. In this sense, the press holds all the cards. Only through press publicity can
officials’ misbehavior reach the level of “scandal” (see Entman, 2012; Marion, 2010; Thompson,
2000). Without the watchful eye of the press and its ability to publicize scandal, crosscutting
accusations of official misconduct would fall on deaf ears. For a scandal to be a scandal, it must
involve the press and its ability to investigate and magnify the events in question.
When citizens encounter a news report about a financial or sex scandal, how do they
evaluate the accused official? A number of empirical studies have examined individual-level
factors that influence scandal evaluations. In general, scandals that raise questions about
financial malfeasance are evaluated more harshly than scandals about moral or sexual violations,
unless the violation involves an additional abuse of power related to the actions in question
(Doherty et al., 2011; Sigal et al., 1988). Other factors include the race and gender of the official
(Berinsky et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2000), the official’s personal traits such as warmth and
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competence (Funk 1996), prior public opinion of the official (Fischle, 2000; Zaller, 1998), the
public’s preexisting levels of cynicism (Dancey, 2011), perceived party support of the accused
official (Stewart, Rose, Rosales, Rudney, Lehner, Miltich, Snyder & Sadecki, 2013),
ideologically motivated adherence to specific moral values like Fairness or Sanctity (Haidt,
2012), and the methods that the official employs to impression manage scandal accusations,
including a denial of the accusations or publicly acknowledging scandal claims and issuing a
formal apology (McGraw, 1991; Sigal et al., 1988; Smith, Smith Powers, & Suarez, 2005).
This chapter explores the impact of scandal publicity on individual-level evaluations
using a survey-experimental method. The analysis focuses on differences in evaluations caused
by typological differences: financial vs. sexual misconduct. It also accounts for group and
ideologically motivated processing of scandal information. Citizens often report possessing
different ideological orientations – liberal or conservative – that may influence how they judge a
scandal affecting a representative of their affiliated group, in this case, the Democratic Party or
Republican Party. Moreover, ideologically motivated values such as Fairness and Sanctity may
also influence evaluations. Since conservatives often make moral evaluations on the basis of the
Sanctity / Degradation moral value dimension, it is expected that conservatives will respond
more negatively to a sex scandal than will liberals. The role of political knowledge in scandal
evaluations is also considered. Political knowledge has been linked to improved policy attitude
stability (Sturgis & Smith, 2010) and a variety of other beneficial outcomes (Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1996; Gomez & Wilson, 2001). Individuals with high levels of political knowledge may
be able to make sense of scandal consequences, doling out harsher punishments to officials
accused of financial scandals than officials accused of sex scandals. Alternatively, political
knowledge has been shown to bias information processing, such that knowledgeable individuals
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are more receptive to partisan news frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; 2007b; Druckman, et al.
2013). Having vast stores of political knowledge means the individual is better able to connect
the gamesmanship in partisan message framing to beliefs held by their side of the political aisle.
In a scandal scenario, knowledgeable individuals may therefore put an equally harsh punishment
on an official accused of a sex scandal than a similar official accused of financial misconduct.
Method
Data. To investigate individual evaluations of financial and sex scandals, an experiment
was embedded in a survey available to participants through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk
system for the time period of December 16 to December 23, 2013. The Mechanical Turk system
allows any United States citizen over the age of 18 with an Amazon account to participate in
various human intelligence tasks (HITs) in exchange for a small monetary reward. Sampling
from the Mechanical Turk participant pool is not random, as participants self-select a given task,
including surveys listed in the system. However, Mechanical Turk samples are more
representative of the U.S. population than student samples and other types of convenience
samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012), lending external validity to experimental results.
Using an automated randomizer in the Qualtrics survey software program, participants (n
= 148) were randomly presented with one of four conditions involving a news story about a
fictitious U.S. Senator, "Sam Hall," a Republican or Democrat who has been accused of
improper financial or sexual behavior. Each news story stimulus was designed using Adobe
InDesign software and was made to appear as realistic as possible (see Appendix B). Participants
were told that the news story recently appeared in “a major daily newspaper.”
There were four treatments in which Senator Hall’s party cue – Republican or Democrat and scandal cue – financial or sexual – were manipulated. Consistent with previous research
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(Berinsky, Hutchings, Mendelberg, Shaker, & Valentino, 2011; Conover 1981), manipulating
cues in this 2X2 full factorial design theoretically allows the study to isolate the effects of
financial and sexual scandal types on evaluations of the official, while accounting for the
official’s party identification. Overall, the party identification cue was explicitly manipulated in
three prominent locations in each treatment stimuli, including the lead paragraph and the photo
caption. The scandal cue was manipulated seven times, including the headline of the article by
alternating the words “improper sexual relationships” with “improper use of campaign funds.”
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Evaluations Analysis
M or %

SD

Range

Moderating Variables
Female
Age
Black
Hispanic
Education
Income
Church Attendance
Republican
Democrat
Conservative
Political Involvement
Political Knowledge

49.32%
36.64
13.51%
5.41%
15.03
$32,331
0.99
14.86%
49.32%
2.66
1.99
0.82

--13.58
----1.78
--1.41
----1.80
0.67
0.23

0 = male, 1 = female
18 to 74 years
0 = not black, 1= black
0 = not Hispanic, 1 = Hispanic
10 to 18 years
$7,500 to $100,000 annually
0 = never, 5 = more than once/week
0 = not Republican, 1 = Republican
0 = not Democrat, 1 = Democrat
0 = very liberal, 6 = very conservative
0 to 4
0 to 1

Independent Variables
Party Cue
Scandal Type Cue

0.51
0.49

0.50
0.50

0 = Democratic cue, 1 = Republican cue
0 = Sexual cue, 1 = Financial cue

Dependent Variable
Evaluation

22.82

20.90

0 to 100

Note: n = 148.
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Measures. Sample Demographics. A standard block of demographic questions was
assessed (Table 2). These included sex, age, ethnicity, years of formal educational, and annual
income. Since religiosity may be a predictor of attitudes toward sexual or financial misconduct,
participants were also asked how often they attended church or a place of worship, from “never”
to “more than once a week.” Party identification was measured by asking participants whether
they identified as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent. Political ideology, the primary
moderating variable, was measured on a 7-point Likert scale that asked participants if they
considered themselves very liberal to very conservative (M = 2.66, sd = 1.80, range 0 to 6).
This study also measured political interest and knowledge. Political interest was
measured using five items. Two of these items have been used in the past to assess interest as
long-term interest in politics (Jin, An, & Simon, 2009). These items asked participants, “how
involved in politics would you say you currently are?” and, “in the past, how much have you
been interested in political campaign during election times?” Two other items asked, “how much
do you enjoy keeping up with the news?”; “how much do you enjoy news about national
politics?”; and, “how much do you enjoy talking about politics with family, friends, or peers?” A
principal components factor analysis revealed a single dimension to these items. Subsequently,
the items were combined into a composite scale (M = 1.99, sd = .67, range = 0 to 4, alpha = .84).
Political knowledge was assessed with the five-item index recommended by Delli Carpini
and Keeter (1996). Close-ended items were used that asked participants if they could identify the
vice president (Joe Biden), whose responsibility it is to determine if a law is constitutional (the
Supreme Court), how much of a majority is required for Congress to override a presidential veto
(2/3 majority), which party has the majority in the House of Representatives (Republican Party),
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and which party is more conservative at the national level (Republican Party). These items were
combined into an composite index (M = .82, sd = .23, range = 0 to 1, alpha = .65).
Independent Variables. The primary independent variable was random exposure to the
experimental treatments (Appendix B). Participants were randomly exposed to a news story
involving a Republican or Democratic official (party cue) accused of financial or sexual
misconduct (scandal type cue). Each story uses similar language to describe the scandal scenario,
and was informationally similar, except for details specific to the type of scandal described.
Treatment groups were approximately balanced, with n = 34 assigned to each treatment.
Dependent Variable. Evaluations of the accused official, Senator Sam Hall, were
assessed using a 100-point feeling thermometer. This measure is identical to those currently used
in the American National Election Study (ANES). After exposure to one of the news stimuli, all
participants were asked, “to indicate how you feel about Senator Sam Hall” from 0 (very
negative attitude) to 100 (very positive attitude) (M = 22.82, sd = 20.90, range = 0 to 83).
Procedure
Since the dependent variable was interval-level, the appropriate statistical modeling
procedure was ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2002;
Kennedy, 2005). The main effects of receiving the Republican or Democratic party cue
manipulation, and receiving the Financial or Sexual scandal cue manipulation were entered in
Model 1 as independent variables, along with interaction terms in Model 2.
Results
The analysis first examines the main effects of the party cue and the scandal type cue on
evaluations of the accused official, Senator Sam Hall (Table 3). Two models are shown in Table
3: Model 1 is unconditional and Model 2 shows results with interactions entered.
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Table 3.
OLS Regression Predicting Individual-Level Scandal Evaluations
Model 1

Model 2

b (SE)

β

b (SE)

β

Party Cue

-4.09
(3.38)

-0.10

-3.85
(3.36)

-0.09

Scandal Type Cue

-6.93
(3.32)

-0.17*

-8.71
(3.33)

-0.21*

Ideology

-1.09
(0.93)

-0.09

-1.40
(0.97)

-0.12

Knowledge
Party Cue X Scandal Type Cue
Party Cue X Ideology
Scandal Type Cue X Ideology
Ideology X Knowledge
Party Cue X Knowledge
Scandal Type Cue X Knowledge
Constant

-23.46
(7.38)

-0.26**

-26.53
(7.54)

---

---

-0.01

---

---

-0.22
(1.70)
2.97
(1.71)

---

---

-0.99
(1.69)

-0.05

---

---

4.12
(2.20)

0.16†

---

---

1.6.2
(1.84)

0.07

---

---

5.04
(1.94)

0.23*

50.62
(7.63)

---

55.33
(8.06)

---

N
R2

148
9.62%

-0.29**

0.14†

148
17.97%

Note: Party cue is coded with Republican = 1. Scandal type cue is coded with sex scandals = 1.
The dependent variable is evaluations of the target Senator, coded 0 (negative) to 100 (positive).
**p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
This study did not make specific predictions about the main effect of party cue on
participant evaluations, since it is assumed that participant evaluations of the accused official
will be at least partially based on participant political ideology, which should mitigate the main
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effect of the target official’s party affiliation. Indeed, there was no main effect of the party cue
on evaluations of the official. There was, however, a main effect of the scandal type cue on

0

Predicted Mean Value of Evaluation
5
10
15
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25

evaluations of the official (β = -0.26, p<.01). This effect is illustrated in Figure 6.

Sex Scandal

Financial Scandal

Figure 6.
Effect of Scandal Type Cue on Evaluations of Accused Official
Note: n = 148. The Y-axis shows predicted values on a 100-point feeling thermometer, generated
from Table 3, model 1. Bars indicate scandal type.
Here, a negative coefficient indicates that exposure to the financial scandal treatment
related to more negative evaluations of the accused official. It also indicates that exposure to the
sex scandal treatment led to slightly more positive evaluations. H5, which predicted learning
about an official’s financial misconduct would result in more negative evaluations than learning
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about sexual misconduct, therefore receives support. Everything else equal, individuals are more

25

Democratic Scandal

20

Republican Scandal

15

Predicted Mean Value of Evaluation

30

punitive toward officials accused of financial malfeasance than sexual dalliances.

Lib

Mod

Con

Participant Ideology

Figure 7.
Interaction Between Party Cue and Participant Ideology
Note: n = 148.
The Y-axis represents the predicted value of evaluations, by participant ideology and scandal
type. Predicted values were generated from Table 3, model 2. Trend lines indicate party cue.
There was no direct effect of participant ideology on the outcome variable. Again, this
was not expected, as there should be an interactive effect between participant ideology and
receiving information about a likeminded or opposition party official. Indeed, there is an
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interactive relationship between participant ideology and party cue (β = 0.18, p<.05). This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 7 by plotting predicted values by ideology and party cue.
As shown in the figure, conservative participants give more positive evaluations on a
Republican official accused of scandal and more negative evaluations of a Democrat. The
reverse is true of liberal participants, who made more negative evaluations of the Republican,
and relatively more positive evaluations of the Democrat. H6A predicted that conservatives
would be more negative toward a Democrat accused of scandal than a Republican. H6A receives
support. H6B expected that liberals would be more negative toward a Republican, and relatively
more positive evaluations of a Democrat accused of scandal. H6B is supported. Consistent with
research showing humans naturally protect members of their group (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel 1982),
including their political groups (Huddy, 2013), these results suggest liberals and conservatives
consider the party affiliation of the accused official when making evaluations about them.
Based on the assumption that ideologically motivated moral values concerning Fairness
and bodily Sanctity may influence scandal evaluations (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2013), H7A
and H7B predicted an interaction between participant ideology and scandal type. The results do
not support H7A or H7B. There was no interaction between participant ideology and the type of
scandal described in the treatments – financial or sexual – suggesting that moral values
associated with political ideology may not exert independent effects on evaluations of the
accused official. Nevertheless, it appears that officials accused of a sex scandal are generally
evaluated more positively than officials accused of financial scandals.
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H8A and H8B predicted an interactive relationship between the level of participant
political knowledge and scandal type. Here it was predicted that high knowledge levels of
knowledge would place harsh evaluations on an official accused of financial misconduct than
would individuals with low knowledge levels (H8A). Conversely, it was expected that
individuals with high knowledge levels may rate officials accused of sex scandals more harshly
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than low knowledge individuals (H8B). The evidence supports H8B.
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Figure 8.
Interaction Between Scandal Type Cue and Political Knowledge
Note: n = 148.
The Y-axis represents the predicted value of evaluations, by political knowledge and scandal
type. Predicted values generated from Table 3, model 2. Trend lines indicate scandal type cue.
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There was a significant interaction between participant political knowledge and scandal
type (β = 0.23, p<.05). As shown in Figure 8, going from the minimum to the maximum value of
the political knowledge scale resulted in a 40-point decrease in mean evaluation scores for
participants exposed to the sex scandal cue. Participants with high knowledge levels appeared to
judge the sex scandal more negatively than individuals with low levels of knowledge. A similar
pattern of results is found with regard to financial scandals, to a lesser degree. The more
knowledgeable the participant, the lower the mean evaluation for an official accused of a
financial scandal. However, even participants who scored zero on the knowledge scale judged an
official accused financial misconduct more severely than an official accused of an affair.
Discussion
Democratic citizens must perform a number of duties. To be considered “active” and
“engaged” members of their polity, they must participate in the popular election of government
representatives; they must serve on juries of their peers; they may elect to serve as civic leaders
in their local communities, or at the state or national level; they must be willing to be drafted into
the armed services in times of military conflict; and they must be willing, at times, to remove
popular but corrupt representatives from office (Clawson & Oxley, 2012).
In this chapter, a survey-experiment demonstrated that citizens are willing and able to
penalize representatives who cheat them financially. Citizens also punish representatives accused
of sex scandals, but not to the same degree as representatives accused of financial misconduct.
Combined, these results suggest that citizens are “rational,” insofar as they appear to recognize
typological differences in scandal severity when making evaluations about the accused, punish
members of the opposition partisan group more harshly than members of their own group, and
are not swayed by rather rigid moral values in assessing officials accused of sexual and financial
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indiscretions. Evaluations of scandal allegations appear to be driven by rational calculations to
protect members of one’s political group (Huddy, 2013) and to preserve representative power in
Washington, rather than a moral judgment about the official’s conduct.
These results can be interpreted optimistically. As hypothesized (H4), individuals deposit
more negative evaluations on more severe offenses of public trust, in this case, financial scandals.
Financial scandals represent violations of a person’s duty as an elected representative, violating
norms of democracy, as well as ethical and legal norms. Sex scandals can involve activities that
violate each of these norms, but they are often merely private violations of social mores
governing what is considered “correct” or “acceptable” sexual behavior. Citizens respond
negatively to accusations of sexual scandal, but they appear to account for the egregiousness of
the offense, adjusting evaluations to meet the severity of the alleged misconduct. Consistent with
previous analyses (Doherty et al., 2011; Sigal et al. 1988), it seems that citizens are able to make
distinctions in scandal severity. However, this assumes that citizens receive equitable
information about various scandal accusations. This is not a safe assumption, as news media tend
to focus on sexual scandals to a greater extent than they do less salacious financial scandals.
Citizens also appear to make group-related calculations about scandal. Human beings
have a natural affinity for, and are predisposed to protect members of their group (Peters, 1979;
Tajfel, 1982). In the realm of politics, this includes protecting partisans who identify with your
ideological identity (Huddy, 2013). This chapter found evidence to support the prediction that
ideology sways evaluations of accused representatives (H5A and H5B). Liberals and
conservatives evaluate members of their group negatively in wake of a scandal, but evaluate the
opposition party members even more negatively. This is quite rational, considering that partisan
officials theoretically represent one’s political interests in larger governing bodies. A scandal
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threatens an official’s reputation and trust, raises the possibility that he or she will be removed
from office, and will no longer be able to represent the citizen’s interests. Given this knowledge,
citizens are less willing to punish members of a group who likely promote their own interests.
Moral judgments related to political ideology do not appear to play a significant role in
individual assessments of scandal. Specifically, the moral value dimensions of Fairness /
Cheating and Sanctity / Degradation do not appear alter assessments of scandal (Graham et al.,
2009; Haidt, 2012). Counter to the prediction (H6A and H6B), there was not a significant
interaction between participant ideology and scandal type, suggesting that moral values
associated with ideology do not play a major role in scandal evaluations, all else being equal.
One explanation for this finding may be that the fictitious scandal scenario was not
sensational or vivid enough to trigger feelings of moral outrage. To trigger disgust, the moral
foundations approach uses scenarios describing sexual relations that are often considered deviant
(e.g., homosexual relations), designed to activate judgments based on the Sanctity / Degradation
value (Haidt, 2012). The stimuli used in this study may not have been effective at activating this
value, since it was a news story providing a detached depiction of improper relations between a
congressman and a mistress (Appendix B). It is possible that treatments highlighting more
salacious sex scandals could prime the Sanctity / Degradation value dimension, subsequently
altering scandal judgments. Likewise, stories that emphasize an official’s lack of fairness to his
constituents may prompt evaluations based on the Fairness / Cheating value.
Political knowledge also plays a key role in scandal evaluations (H8A and H8B). The
evidence suggests that judgments about officials accused of misconduct is shaped by the
participant’s level of political sophistication. Participants with high levels of knowledge appear
less capable of processing the magnitude of the misconduct, assigning more negative evaluations
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to sexual misconduct than their low-knowledge counterparts (H8B). Low knowledge participants,
compared to high knowledge individuals, gave a much more positive rating to officials accused
of an extramarital affair, suggesting that low knowledge participants may not have been able to
attach the information about scandal to their prior beliefs.
Since knowledge is related to making what could be called “partisan errors” in
information processing (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; 2007b; Druckman et al., 2013), it appears
that knowledge also motivates selective processing of scandal information. Rather than being
able to gauge the severity of scandal, knowledge may motivate citizens to connect news about
the “game” of politics – scandal, in this case – to their prior partisan affiliations and ideological
orientations. This translates into more negative evaluations of an official accused of sexual
dalliances. Individuals at every level of knowledge, meanwhile, judged officials accused
financial misconduct more negatively than officials accused of sexual misbehavior.
Ironically, the results presented in this chapter suggest that citizens tend to exact stiff
punishments on officials accused of financial fraud while forgiving officials of extramarital
affairs. Citizens treat scandal severity in exactly the opposite manner than do journalists.
Whereas the press obsesses over the private sexual liaisons of public officials, citizens appear
more cautious about officials who take their constituents tax dollars. This pattern of citizen
judgment suggests that democracy may benefit from increased media attention to financial
misconduct. Assuming that citizens receive news about financial malfeasance, it appears that
citizens will use such information to punish officials accused of severe breaches of democratic,
legal and ethical norms. Yet financial scandals tend to receive little media scrutiny, leaving
citizens unaware, or marginally aware of their representatives’ financial misconduct.
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CHAPTER 4. ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

Introduction
Political scandals have routinely plagued the United States Congress (Farquhar, 2003).
During the past decade, intense public and media scrutiny has resulted in both major political
parties losing Congressional seats in the aftermath of a scandal (Basinger, 2013; Marion, 2010;
Praino et al., 2013). To date, several studies have examined factors that affect an official’s
survivability after scandal accusations are made, focusing primarily on the impact of publicity on
post-scandal electoral survivability. For instance, Herrick (2000) found that the frequency of
Washington Post stories about a House scandal related negatively to House member electoral
security. Similarly, Shea (1999) found that frequency of negative local news stories adversely
impacted a congressman’s electoral “survivability,” or the ability to avoid resignation and win
reelection. In a more recent analysis, Ulbig and Miller (2012) found that news coverage of
gubernatorial scandal related to declines in public support for the accused. Examining
presidential scandals, Entman (2012) found a “cascading” effect of scandal publicity involving a
reinforcing cycle of opposition party claims, press coverage, and public response. During
election periods, the decision for the opposition to pursue scandal may have particularly
damaging effects on the incumbent official’s electoral prospects (Fogarty, 2013).
Previous research has also examined the impact of scandal media coverage and other,
personal and institutional factors on electoral outcomes in subsequent election cycles. For
instance, examining the House banking scandal of 1992, Jacobson and Dimock (1994) found that
the members implicated suffered at the ballot box. As the authors put it, “the House banking
scandal was the major reason for the unusually high turnover of House seats in 1992. It
contributed significantly to exit from the House by all routes: retirement, defeat in the primary
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election, and defeat in the general election” (p. 621). Other studies have reached similar
conclusions about the House banking scandal and other types of financial and sexual misconduct
(Ahuja, Beavers, Berreau, Dodson, Hibbing, Hourigan, Showalter, & Walz, 1994; Basinger,
2013; Groseclose & Krehbiel, 1994; Stewart, 1994; Welch & Hibbing, 1997). Both financial and
sexual scandals have real electoral consequences, affecting public opinion, the outcome of
elections and vote share in subsequent election cycles (Brown, 2006; Peters & Welch, 1980).
There is reason to believe, however, that the public does not always get to decide the
electoral fortunes of the accused. The anecdote related above regarding former Representative
Anthony Weiner provides us with evidence that during sex scandals intense media scrutiny
compels party leaders to shed the member in question, forcing them to resign their seats
(Hernandez, 2011). In other cases, for instance, in Mark Foley’s congressional page sex
messaging scandal, Republican leadership also moved quickly, pressuring Foley to resign so that
media attention would die away and regular legislative business could resume uninterrupted
(Halloran, 2011). Since for-profit media norms and routines may oblige outlets to pay more
attention to sexual scandals than to financial scandals, there is also an expectation that sex
scandals will result in electoral “defeat” at higher rates than will financial scandals – sex
scandals receive such intense coverage, members often have to step aside rather than draw
attention from their party’s political agenda. This chapter investigates this possibility using
aggregated data, modeling the interactive effects of scandal type and frequency of media
coverage on electoral outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives over a 16-year period.
Method
Data. To analyze the above hypotheses, an aggregate dataset was constructed that
captured variables associated with members of the U.S. House of Representatives who were
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accused of a scandal during January 1, 1996 to November 6, 2012. House members who were
accused of a scandal were identified using a variety of sources, including the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, investigative reports listed on the House Ethics Committee website
(http://ethics.house.gov), and reference texts discussing House members accused of scandal
(Herrick, 2003; Long, 2007; Marion, 2010; Roberts, 2001; Thompson, 1995). One problem with
relying on these sources is that they tend to exclude non-criminal scandal or scandals that the
opposition party decides not to pursue. For example, in the case of Anthony Weiner, an ethics
committee investigation was called for by House Republicans, but was never pursued after
Weiner resigned from office. Since more recent cases like Weiner’s may not be listed in any of
these sources, each source was cross-referenced with Wikipedia’s ongoing, crowd-sourced “list
of federal political sex scandals in the United States.” Combined, these sources resulted in an
inclusive list of members accused of scandal from 1996 to 2012 (Appendix C).
Members were only included in the analyses if they met two criteria: (1) the member was
investigated by the House Ethics Committee or violated a criminal law, or (2) received media
coverage regarding an act of financial or sexual misconduct. Both criteria were necessary. For a
scandal to be considered as such, the press must reveal the scandal while the representative is
still in office (Marion, 2010, p. 11; Thompson, 2000). For instance, it is known that President
John F. Kennedy had extramarital affairs while in office. Yet the press chose not to cover these
events while Kennedy was president, eliminating the possibility that Kennedy’s power would be
delegitimized by scandal while he retained his position (Marion, 2010, p. 11). Therefore, while
we may think of the Kennedy affairs as “scandals,” they would not meet the criteria for inclusion
here since Kennedy’s power was not compromised by press coverage and public reaction. Based
on these criteria, n = 55 U.S. House scandals were used in the analysis.
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Measures. Controls. Rottinghaus’s (2014) research of Executive scandals, and Herrick
(2000) and Basinger’s (2013) analyses of congressional scandals were used as frameworks. First,
this study collected and aggregated demographic and behavioral data on each U.S. House
member to use as controls in the subsequent procedures (Table 4). First, data were collected on
the representative’s number of years in Congress, or tenure, at the time the scandal occurred.
Tenure factors into the likelihood a House member will resign or retire his post (Hibbing, 1982).
Members who have represented their districts for long periods of time may be better able to
weather scandal accusations that new members who have fewer resources in their home districts.
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics for Electoral Analysis
M

SD

Range

Controls
Tenure
Leader
Republican
Vote Share

15.86
40.00%
56.00%
68.12%

9.99
----13.65

1 to 39 years
0 = not a leader, 1 = leader
0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican
43.00 to 100.00% in previous election

IVs
Financial Scandal
Media Coverage

70.00%
1.63

--1.29

0 = sexual scandal, 1 = financial scandal
0 to 5.00 (log)

DV
Electoral Outcome

0.62

0.83

0 = win reelection, 1 = lose reelection, 2 = resign

Note: n = 51.
Two representatives ran unopposed, garnering a vote share of 100.00% in the pre-scandal
election. Following Herrick (2000), the study used Washington Post stories as a proxy for
national media attention. Media coverage was logged to account for significant skew (p<.001)
that resulted from many scandals garnering very few stories and some scandals engendering high
amounts of coverage. Subsequent modeling was checked using the unlogged media variable.
Data were also collected on whether the member held a leadership position in the House
at the time the scandal was revealed. A leader was defined as a House member who held the rank

62

of speaker, majority or minority leaders and whips, or committee chairs (Herrick, 2000).
Members in these positions of leadership, who possess institutional power, might be more
insulated from the effects of scandal. Leaders might also receive more media attention because
they hold more power in the chamber. Since party control of the House changes from time to
time, it is also important to consider a member’s party affiliation. The Republican variable
therefore accounts, in part, for potential differences in formal sanctions for members of in-group
and rival parties. The analysis also controlled for vote share in the election prior to the scandal
accusations. The vote share variable was continuous, and used a measure of electoral security
and competition within the member’s district. House members who had a high vote share in the
election prior to a scandal accusation are assumed to have a higher degree of electoral security.
Independent Variables. Media coverage was measured by the frequency of Washington
Post stories that mentioned a scandal. This measure acts as a proxy for national media attention
and is based on Herrick’s (2000) study of media effects on post-scandal electoral outcomes.
Importantly, story mentions were only measured from the day a scandal was first reported, until
the day the member resigned, or until the day of the next election. This procedure was used to
eliminate any irrelevant stories prior to the scandal event, and to eliminate scandal coverage that
occurred after resignation or Election Day and had no effect on the member’s electoral fortunes.
The LexisNexis Academic database was used to collect data. Media stories were found
by searching key terms associated with a scandal (e.g., “Anthony Weiner” “sex” “scandal”). For
a news story to be included in the analysis, the story had to mention the representative by name,
and make a direct reference to the scandal. In each case, key terms related to the scandal varied
and when scandals overlapped, coding for inclusion became problematic. Therefore each article
was analyzed to make ensure it contained a mention of both the scandal and the member’s name.
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The second independent variable was type of scandal – financial or sexual. Scandals vary widely
in context, but can be delineated as primarily consisting of financial or sexual misconduct
(Thompson, 2000). Each scandal included in the analysis was coded as either “financial” (e.g.,
bribery) or “sexual” (e.g., extramarital affair) in nature and represented in the analysis using a
dichotomous dummy variable. Since this study’s hypotheses make specific predictions about sex
scandals, sex scandals were coded high and financial scandals were used as the reference group.
By interacting the scandal type dummy variable with the media coverage variable, it was
possible to assess the frequency of media stories devoted to financial and sexual scandals.
Dependent Variable. A trichotomous dependent variable assessed each representative’s
electoral outcome in the wake of scandal. This variable measured whether the House member
won reelection after being accused of a scandal, whether they ran for reelection and lost, or
whether they resigned after the accusations were made public. Winning reelection was coded low
and used as the reference group. Thus, the analysis compares the effects of media coverage and
scandal type on the probability of losing reelection or resigning to winning reelection.
Importantly, scandals may influence whether a congressman decides to strategically retire or
resign from office (Groseclose & Krehbiel, 1994; Wilkins, 2012) and this analysis accounts for
this possibility by making resignation a unique outcome on the dependent variable.
Results
Media Coverage of U.S. House Scandals. The study first used a series of one-sample ttests to explore the impact of scandal type – financial or sexual – on frequency of scandal news
coverage. To show changes in scandal coverage over time, scandals were divided into three
periods for this analysis, corresponding to the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton (19962000), George W. Bush (2001-2008), and Barack Obama (2009-2012) (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9.
Average Number of Washington Post Stories By Scandal Type and Time Period
Note: n = 51.The Y-axis represents the average number of Washington Post news stories
covering U.S. House members accused of financial and sexual scandals from 1996 to 2000 (n =
6), 2001 to 2008 (n = 21), and 2009 to 2012 (n = 23). These values were logged to reduce skew.
In the three time periods analyzed, the average number of Washington Post stories
mentioning a House sex scandal X! was greater than the average number of stories mentioning
House financial scandals X! . Using a one-tailed test (X! −    X! ), these differences were
significant during the Clinton period t(6) = 2.24, p<.05, the Bush period t(21) = 1.58, p<.10, and
the Obama period from 2009 to 2012 t(23) = 1.89, p<.05. Notably, financial scandals involving
former lobbyist Jack Abramoff occurred during the Bush period, temporarily increasing the
average number of stories about House financial scandals. Yet this appears to be an exception to
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the rule of coverage. Sex scandals garnered more overall coverage than did financial scandals,
providing additional support for H1, which predicted sex scandals will receive more coverage.
Media Coverage and Electoral Outcomes. Considering the unordered, trichotomous
nature of the dependent variable, the predictive analysis used a multinomial logistic regression
procedure (Long & Freese, 2006). This type of multivariate regression can measure the effect of
each independent variable on the probability of being coded in one of the categories of the
dependent variable, in this case, as winning reelection, losing reelection or resigning.
Additionally, standard errors were clustered by year to account for changes to the media
and political environment that may have occurred during the period analyzed. Throughout the
1990s there was little coverage of political scandal compared to substantive policy concerns
(Morris & Clawson, 2005). But the mass media and political environments have evolved since
the 1990s (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). During the 16 years studied, control of Congress and the
Executive branch changed hands several times, the media underwent economic setbacks, and
partisan niche audiences were increasingly driving news content (Stroud, 2011), which could
result in partisan differences in scandal news coverage (Puglisi & Snyder, 2011). The press has
also become more active in seeking out and reporting political scandals over the past three to
four decades (Entman, 2013; Lichter & Amundson, 1994; Marion, 2010), and the Internet may
only fuel coverage as provocative scandals like that of former New York Representative
Anthony Weiner go viral on the Web. There is also unlimited space for stories on the Web, and
Web stories may be more likely to cater to “soft” scandal news (Hamilton, 2004).
As shown in Table 4, there was an inconsistent and negligible impact of the control
variables on electoral outcomes after scandal accusations have been made. Only three variables –
tenure, leadership, and vote share – predicted electoral outcomes following scandal accusations.
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In the case of tenure, it appears that members who were in the House longer were less likely to
lose (b = -0.07, SE = 0.02, p<.01) or resign (b =-19, SE = 0.11, p<.10) following scandal
accusations. Leaders were less likely to lose reelection following a scandal than non-leaders (b
=-1.09, SE = 0.53, p<.05), although leadership had no effect on resignations. Similarly,
representatives with high vote share in the election prior to scandal were more likely to be
reelected after being accused of misconduct (b =-0.10, SE = 0.04, p<.01). The same effect of
vote share did not emerge for resignations, suggesting that popularity within a member’s district
was not a key consideration in deciding whether to resign following scandal.
There was a direct effect of scandal type (b = -3.62, SE = 1.38, p<.01) and frequency of
press coverage (b =1.75, SE = 0.52, p<.001) on the probability of resigning. Specifically,
financial scandals were less likely than sex scandals to result in resignation. More frequent media
coverage also increased the likelihood of resignation. The analysis therefore shows support for
H9B, which predicted that frequent media coverage would result in resignations from office.
However, the analysis does not support H9A, which predicted media coverage would
result in an increased likelihood of defeat. There was an insignificant direct effect of media
exposure on losing reelection. There was also no significant difference between financial and
sexual scandals in terms of the probability of losing reelection.
Interaction Between Scandal Type and Press Coverage. H10 predicted an interactive
relationship between scandal type, financial or sexual in nature, and frequency of press coverage
about the scandal. To explore this possibility, the two variables were interacted in the
multinomial logit model. As shown in Table 5, both interaction terms were significant predictors
of electoral outcomes. Specifically, there was a significant interactive effect on losing reelection
(b =-1.01, SE = 0.48, p<.05) and resigning (b =1.12, SE = 0.43, p<.05) compared to winning
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reelection. To better understand these effects, predicted probabilities were generated from the
model in Table 5 and are plotted in Figure 10.
Table 5.
Multinomial Regression Predicting Post-Scandal Electoral Outcomes
Lose Reelection
(vs. Win Reelection)

Controls
Tenure
Leader
Republican
Vote Share

IVs
Financial Scandal
Media Exposure
Interaction
Scandal X Media
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N
PRE

Resign
(vs. Win Reelection)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

-0.09**
(0.03)

-0.07**
(0.02)

-0.12*
(0.06)

-0.19†
(0.11)

-0.85
(0.68)
0.40
(0.57)

-1.09*
(0.53)
-0.15
(0.54)

0.66
(1.01)
0.29
(1.22)

1.14
(1.43)
0.55
(1.40)

-0.08*
(0.04)

-0.10**
(0.04)

-0.05
(0.06)

-0.02
(0.06)

-0.43
(0.92)

-0.48
(1.01)

-1.82
(1.29)

-3.62**
(1.38)

0.41
(0.39)

-0.19
(0.46)

1.05*
(0.49)

1.75**
(0.52)

---

-1.01*
(0.48)

---

1.12*
(0.43)

34.29%
-31.16***
51
4.80%

43.19%
-26.94***
51
9.40%

34.29%
-31.16***
51
4.80%

43.19%
-26.94***
51
9.40%

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.
Standard errors are clustered by year, to mitigate temporal effects on electoral outcomes. I ran
alternative models using CNN transcript mentions of scandal, finding substantively similar results
(see Appendix D). For model parsimony, I included only the Washington Post media indicator. A
logistic regression predicting post-scandal wins and losses created highly similar results.
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The upper left-hand panel of Figure 10 shows the probability of winning reelection for
members accused of a financial scandal is high (Probability of winning = 0.78) and decreases
with media coverage until reaching its nadir at the high end of press coverage (Probability of
winning = 0.50). The same effect occurs with sex scandals, but to a greater extent.
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Figure 10.
Interactive Effect of Scandal Type and Media Coverage on Electoral Outcomes
Note: The heavy blue line represents probabilities that U.S. House members accused of a sex
scandal were coded “win reelection,” “lose reelection” or “resign” on the electoral outcome
variable, by frequency of media coverage. The dashed red line represents probabilities that U.S.
House members accused of a financial scandal were coded “win reelection,” lose reelection” or
“resign” on the electoral outcome variable, by frequency of media coverage. These probabilities
are generated from Table 5, holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.

69

The probability a member accused of sex scandal will win reelection at the lowest level
of media coverage is 0.59. The probability that a representative accused of a sex scandal will win
reelection at the highest level of media coverage is approximately 0.10.
As shown in the upper right-hand panel of Figure 10 representatives are about equally
likely to lose reelection at every level of media coverage. In terms of resignations, coverage of
sex scandals led to higher rates of resignation for sex scandals than financial scandals, as
indicated by the steeper slope in the bottom panel of Figure 10. As media intensity increases, the
probability that a member of the U.S. House accused of a sex scandal will resign increases
rapidly, approaching a probability of 0.80 at the highest levels of media attention. The same
trend holds for financial scandals, but to a far lesser extent. In the case of financial scandals, high
media coverage resulted in a probability of resigning of approximately 0.38.
These results show partial support for H10, which predicted that sex scandals would
garner more press coverage than financial scandals, in turn relating to a higher number of early
resignations from office. High doses of financial scandal press coverage relate to increases in the
probability a member of the U.S. House will resign office. However, the effect of press coverage
on post-scandal resignations is more pronounced when the scandal involves some type of sexual
misconduct. The overall pattern shows there representatives accused of financial misconduct are
more likely to retain their seats, no matter the amount of press attention, whereas media exert
powerful effects on whether an official accused of sexual misconduct “survives” electorally.
Discussion
This chapter demonstrates that, across three time periods corresponding to the Clinton
(1996-2000), Bush (2001-2008) and Obama (2009-2012) administrations, U.S. House members
accused of a sex scandal received more frequent media attention than did representatives accused
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of a financial scandal. During the Bush years (2001-2008), the difference in the average
frequency of press mentions was less pronounced, possibly due to widespread financial
corruption associated with former lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Yet the trend across all three time
periods was for sex scandals to receive more frequent coverage than financial scandals (H1).
Press attention to official misconduct, in turn, has detrimental effects on electoral
prospects of the accused members (H9A and H9B). Indeed, as media coverage of scandal
escalates, the probability that a representative accused of a sex scandal will resign approaches 1.0.
Meanwhile representatives accused of a financial scandal not only do not resign, they often run
for and win reelection. Contrary to extant experimental evidence (Doherty et al., 2011), citizens
do not appear to make harsh electoral evaluations about representatives accused of financial
misconduct. Possibly, this finding is related to the notion that Americans dislike Congress as a
whole, but like their own congressman (Gallup, 2013). Popular representatives who offer bribes
in Washington may add to widespread public distrust of Congress, but may add to the political
cache of the individual congressman. That is, Americans may not like the idea of congressmen
stealing, but when their congressman steals, it may be perceived as acceptable.
What is perhaps most striking about the effect of media coverage on scandal is that
citizens rarely receive the opportunity to judge officials accused of sexual misconduct at the
ballot box, since these officials almost all resign as media coverage – and party pressure –
increases (H10). As Hernandez’s (2011) article suggests, sex scandals like Anthony Weiner’s
create a media attention “problem” for the party. Political capital is a finite resource, and it
appears that party leadership is not willing to burn that capital by supporting likeminded
representatives accused of salacious scandals that distract from party goals. Based on these
findings, it may “safer” for a representative to steal than score; electoral security is jeopardized
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most when an official is accused of sexual mischief, creating media attention that derails party
goals, and that must be remedied by the removal of the problematic official.
Importantly, this study considered the possibility that Washington Post coverage may
not accurately reflect national attention to different types of scandal, or to individual scandals
(but see Herrick, 2000). Substituting mentions of scandals in CNN transcripts, this study found
substantively similar results, suggesting that using Washington Post stories was not a limitation
(see Appendix D). This chapter does not claim that media coverage of political scandal is
uniform across all national media outlets, only that a trend appears to be that more coverage is
allotted to sexual transgressions and that this coverage tends to lead to high rates of resignations
from public office. It is plausible that there are partisan differences in scandal coverage (Puglisi
& Snyder, 2011; Stroud, 2011) that could result in differing electoral outcomes, a possibility that
deserves further scholarly attention. Additionally, for parsimony, this study only analyzed
scandals affecting members of the U.S. House of Representatives. It is conceivable that U.S.
Senators accused of a scandal receive differing patterns of media attention.
One implication of this study is that the economic rewards that come with increased press
attention to congressional sex scandals do not always mesh with democratic norms. By inflating
audience attention with entertaining scandal narratives and shoring up their profit margins, it
appears that the national media may inadvertently focus more public and elite attention on a type
of congressional scandal that is arguably the lesser of two evils (Entman, 2012). The press,
placed in this framework, holds great power over the parties, and the public’s ability to fulfill
their democratic duty through popular election of representatives. The media cannot defeat an
official accused of a sex scandal by literally casting a vote in the next election, but the media can
go far in getting the congressman’s name removed from the ballot altogether.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

Introduction
The press has been criticized for being unable or unwilling to fulfill its role as a conduit
for accurate, engaging and useful political information. It has been argued that the press focuses
too much on political gamesmanship and electoral strategy, contributing little to the substantive
discussion of policy and public affairs (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Fallows, 1997). It has been
said that journalists do not adjudicate competing partisan claims, leaving the audience in the
unlucky position of deciding which political claims are factual and which are bogus (Pingree,
2011). Institutional routines that demand journalists pay attention to official statements result in
the government “wagging the dog,” sending journalists on wild goose chases for the latest tidbit
of newsworthy information and leaving audiences with fragmented views of political and social
reality (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). The press provides much-needed political information to the
electorate, but not nearly to the degree it could, or should (Patterson, 2013).
Given the many criticisms hurled at the press, and the many empirical studies that have
confirmed the basis of these criticisms, it seems unlikely that the press does an outstanding, or
even an adequate job of covering political scandal. Indeed, the evidence presented in this study
suggest that the press is not “properly calibrated,” in Entman’s (2012) terminology, to the
severity or implications of political scandals affecting the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
branches of federal government, and scandals involving state governors. Rather than provide
intense scrutiny to profound forms of criminal political corruption that involve financial
scheming, the national media give as much, and often more attention to the trivial but
entertaining details of our political officials’ sex lives. Extramarital affairs that were once
considered private issues off limits to journalists are now thought to be fair game (Marion, 2010).
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Accusations of deviant sexual activity are now blown up into Watergate-level scandals that
generate wall-to-wall coverage until the official’s party forces him to resign.
Ironically, resignations that follow sex scandal publicity are likely premature. Officials
accused of sex scandals are not regarded as pariahs by ordinary citizens; on the other hand, the
public seems to evaluate these officials more positively than officials accused of extortion,
bribery, tax evasion and other forms of financial misconduct. The manner in which the public
interprets the severity of political scandals, in other words, is entirely “rational” and in direct
opposition to the how the press reports them. Driven by habitual attention to official statements,
and by economic incentives to create entertaining and understandable narratives, the press
emphasizes the titillating, salacious, sensational but ultimately inconsequential aspects of
political sex lives. The public, while interested, do not often find these matters worthy of
removing an official from office, especially if the official is otherwise popular and effective. Yet
the overwhelming publicity given to sex scandals forces the hand of party leadership, who must
put party image and the ability to leverage public opinion ahead of any one party member’s
career; the party forces the official to resign, rather than allow him to remain a distraction.
The press, it seems, wields incredible power to unseat officials accused of sexual
misconduct. Journalists could elect to ignore or downplay partisan allegations of sexual dalliance,
and focus more intensely on real crimes committed by public officials who citizens have
entrusted to their formal representatives. Instead, by focusing on sex scandals, the press allows
partisan officials to use these events as political hand grenades, derailing the opposition’s ability
to create policy, direct public opinion, and improve its image. Sex scandals are like jokers in the
card “game” of politics. They are wild and wooly but understandable narratives that describe
events as old as human sexuality itself. They can result in a partisan backfire, damaging the
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accusers as much or more than the accused (Zaller, 1998). However, sex scandals represent lowhanging fruit for news media with dwindling budgets and personnel. They are provocative,
dramatic and understandable narratives that pique audience interest. And thus, sex scandals fit
snuggly within the economic incentives and institutional motivations of the national press.
If there were any one area of politics that the press should cover well it is the area of
scandal. Participatory democracy assumes an active and engaged citizenry who can identify and
judge corrupt leaders, removing them by way of the ballot (Clawson & Oxley, 2012). The press
could facilitate this process by showing the way for citizens to punish truly criminal leaders,
officials who have violated not only society’s sense of personal morality, but what is considered
appropriate behavior by democratically elected representatives. Certainly, sex scandals represent
transgressions of social mores regulating what is considered “correct” or “deviant sexual
behavior. Sex scandals may involve illegal behavior or the breaking of campaign promises about
serving as a “moral leader” or “restoring moral leadership” to Washington. The majority of
political sex scandals, however, do not break these boundaries. They are private affairs, and
relatively harmless when compared side by side with official extortion and bribery. To argue that
former New York Representative Anthony Weiner’s “sexting” scandal is on the level of
Watergate, or of the Jack Abramoff Indian casino scandal is a wasted exercise. Such scandals are
qualitatively different, with the latter scandals representing wider breaches of democratic, ethical
and legal norms than events involving the aberrant sexual behavior of Anthony Weiner.
Yet the frequency with which the press covers financial and sexual misconduct indicates
that scandal typology is not a major consideration when deciding which scandals to report. This
study does not claim that all journalists everywhere ignore such a consideration. Nonetheless, the
aggregate data presented in this study do not lie. The data speak volumes about what the press
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and the public view to be an important issues, and the divergences between these two viewpoints.
Below, the major findings of this study are summarized. The study’s implications for citizens,
parties, and national news media are addressed. This chapter also sets forth a number of realistic
– and radical – recommendations for generating “properly calibrated” scandal coverage. Many of
these recommendations may seem impractical in the short term. In the long-term, changes to the
news media may be necessary to engage citizens, reduce or eliminate corruption among
government officials, and maintain the health and functionality of American democracy.
Summary of Findings
Chapter 1. The purpose of this study was to investigate patterns of scandal news
coverage, paying careful attention to how the press handles scandal typology. Chapter 1 outlined
several overarching questions that guided this study’s empirical analyses. First, does the national
news media pay more attention, on average, to egregious political scandals involving financial
misconduct than it does scandals involving violations of society’s sexual mores? What effects do
patterns of media attention have on the electoral fortunes of accused officials? Finally, how do
citizens process scandal news and evaluate officials accused of wrongdoing?
Chapter 2. The first step in investigating these questions was establishing that the press
indeed covers different types of scandal – the financial and sexual varieties – in different ways.
Using five and a half years of aggregated Pew News Coverage Index (NCI) data, Chapter 2
demonstrated that the press provides more frequent coverage to sex scandals, on average, than it
provides financial scandals. Analyzing over 4,000 news stories and 24 scandal scenarios
affecting officials from the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the federal
government and scandals involving state governors, this chapter showed that the press focuses its
energies on cases of sexual scandal. Financial scandals like that of former Illinois Governor Rod
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Blagojevich can generate intense media scrutiny, but these are exceptions, not the rule. The rule
is for relatively trivial sex scandals to receive more frequent press coverage, on average.
Frequency of scandal coverage is regulated by the media format. Since cable television
and online news have large “newsholes,” must compete directly with pure forms of
entertainment programming delivered via the same medium (Fallows, 1997), and cater to “soft
news” audiences (Hamilton, 2004), more scandal stories appear on cable and the Internet
compared to print newspapers. In the war to grab and maintain audience attention, television and
Internet news has attempted to make its programming more entertaining (Fallows, 1997). The
same could be said of print newspapers, but no to the same degree. This study shows that print
newspapers downplay all types of scandal news, while cable and the Internet thrive on it.
The results of Chapter 2 show that there is one factor that may mitigate the frequency of
scandal coverage. If an official retires within two weeks of scandal allegations, it appears that
scandal coverage is reduced. A logical explanation for this finding may be that the opposition
party no longer has cause to pursue allegations via official statements; the opposition party has
received exactly what it wanted, with the official resigning and being stripped of his power.
Institutional norms motivate journalists to rely on official statements to guide their coverage.
Without official statements to point the finger of blame at the official, press coverage wanes.
It was also discovered that liberal- and conservative-leaning cable TV news networks
(Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2011) might have their own fragmented, partisan scandal agendas. As
predicted, the results suggest that Fox News provides more coverage, on average, to scandals
that reflect poorly on Democrats than scandals that portray Republicans in a negative light. Since
Fox tends to be more politically conservative than other networks, this result was consistent with
previous research on fragmented partisan agendas (Stroud, 2011). Counter to this study’s
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hypothesis, liberal-leaning CNN also gave more attention to Democratic scandals than
Republican scandals. It is possible that other elements of scandals, in particular, the
entertainment value of sex scandals, led to more coverage of Democratic scandals. Since CNN is
a for-profit news organization, they may focus heavy attention on any type of scandal, involving
Democratic or Republican officials. In other words, partisan considerations may not be the only
considerations when determining the frequency of scandal news coverage.
Chapter 3. The press may give more credence to sex scandals by giving them more
frequent coverage than financial misconduct. Do patterns of scandal coverage match patterns of
public evaluations? Using a survey-based experiment administered to an Amazon Mechanical
Turk subject pool, this chapter replicated evidence from previous studies showing that the public
is relatively unconcerned about allegations of sexual misconduct (Doherty et al., 2011). Rather,
the public appears to process scandals rationally. Citizens assign harsher evaluations to officials
accused of severe forms of financial misconduct, in this case, an official who used his office to
commit fraud. The public punishes financial misconduct; the press punishes sexual misconduct.
There were several factors that regulated how citizens gauged evaluations of accused
officials. First and foremost, no scandal had a main effect on evaluations. All officials accused of
scandal were evaluated negatively. A key differentiating mechanisms in scandal evaluation was
partisan group affiliation (Huddy, 2013). Conservatives protected a scandal-plagued member of
the Republican Party, whereas liberals protected an identical likeminded Democratic official. All
else equal, human beings are likely to protect members of their group (Tajfel, 1982), including
their political group. In the case of scandal, ideology drives patterns of evaluations.
Second, the impact of ideologically motivated moral values on scandal evaluations was
assessed. Conservatives tend to rely on the value dimension of sexual and bodily Sanctity /
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Degradation when making judgments about social problems or official wrongdoing (Graham et
al., 2009; Haidt, 2012). Liberals do not. Instead, liberals make moral evaluations on the basis of
the Fairness / Cheating moral value dimension, suggesting that liberals will process scandal
information within the context of fairness. The expectation, then, is that liberals will be more
critical of financial scandals and conservatives will be more critical of sex scandals. Nevertheless,
this chapter did not support hypotheses associated with ideologically driven values and scandal
typology. Liberals and conservatives appeared more motivated to judge officials accused of
scandal on the basis of partisan affiliation rather than the type of scandal involved.
This chapter also examined the role of political knowledge in moderating the effect of
scandal information on official evaluations. Individuals with large stores of political knowledge
were hypothesized to process scandal news differently than individuals who don’t know much
about the political world. Specifically, individuals with high levels of knowledge were
hypothesized to either (A) be more able to gauge scandal severity, providing harsher
punishments to more sever financial scandals than sex scandals, or (B) be more able to connect
prior beliefs with partisan scandal information, providing harsh evaluations to officials accused
of both financial and sexual misconduct. Evidence was found supporting the second hypothesis.
Even controlling for frequency of church attendance as a proxy for participant religiosity and the
participant’s level of ideological attachment and concomitant moral values, this chapter found
that individuals with high levels of political knowledge judge officials involved in sex scandals
more negatively than do individuals with low levels of knowledge. Financial misconduct
engenders almost equally negative reactions from low and high knowledge participants. These
findings suggest that rather than helping citizens to grasp the ramifications of scandal and dole
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out corresponding punishments at the ballot box, political knowledge appears to bias participants
to consider the “game” of politics and connect scandal information to prior political beliefs.
Chapter 4. Having established that the press pays more attention to the average sex
scandal than it does the average financial scandal, Chapter 4 investigates the electoral
ramifications of press coverage. Using aggregated data on the U.S. House of Representatives
from 1996 to 2012, this chapter explores the impact of scandal typology and press coverage by
scandal type on the electoral fortunes of accused members. It found that officials accused of
sexual misconduct overwhelmingly resign their office, and resign quickly, rather than generate
media coverage that may distract from their party’s agenda or damage their party’s image.
Financial scandals, meanwhile, received less press attention, and House members accused of
financial misconduct were unlikely to resign. Voters did not often punish financial misconduct
by “throwing the bastards out” of office. Yet the likelihood an official accused of financial
misconduct losing an election following allegations was higher than the likelihood of losing an
election, mainly due to the fact sex scandals result in high rates of resignation.
Popularity within one’s district, as measured by accounting for vote share in the previous
election cycle, insulated House members from losing the election following scandal. However,
vote share had no effect on resignations, suggesting that public opinion of an official had little
effect on his likelihood of resigning or staying in office. Party leaders who were involved in a
scandal were also better insulated from electoral defeat, possibly because of their standing in
Congress and ability to fundraise for political ads and other messages that could deflect scandal.
Again, party leadership status has no effect on resignations following scandal, indicating that
standing in the House had no direct effect on whether a scandal resulted in leaving office early.
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Using Washington Post stories as a proxy for national media attention, this chapter also
found that more press coverage was given to sexual scandals than financial scandals, on average,
across a sixteen-year timeframe. This finding builds on the results of Chapter 2. It suggests that
the national news media has been focused on political sex scandals at least since 1996. While
corruption like that of the Jack Abramoff scandal isn’t ignored, such scandals are often not the
focus of press coverage. Moreover, patterns of press coverage have real-world electoral
outcomes. Intense media scrutiny in the wake of sex scandals forces party leadership to make
officials resign their positions, as was the case with Anthony Weiner (Hernandez, 2011), Mark
Foley (Halloran, 2011), Gary Condit (Standora, 2001), and Eric Massa (Benjamin & McAuliff,
2010). Media scrutiny of financial malfeasance also leads to resignations from office, but it is
much more likely that officials accused of financial wrongdoing win reelection.
Implications
This dissertation contributes to the literature by illuminating the complex interplay of
communication and decision-making transpiring in scandal scenarios. Rather than taking an “all
scandals are created equal” approach, this study shows that different types of scandals – of the
sexual and financial variety – have different effects on press coverage and public interpretations.
While the press often pursues accusations of sexual misconduct, the public focuses on financial
misbehavior. And since the press downplays official financial misconduct relative to sexual
dalliances, the public has a reduced likelihood of receiving information that would allow them to
make critical decisions about elected officials accused of financial malfeasance. Meanwhile, the
media firestorm following a sex scandal is so relatively intense that officials resign quickly in
order to avoid unwanted publicity. In essence, this study contributes the literature by showing
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that the media’s scandal agenda is out of sync with the public’s, making it electorally safer for
officials to steal from their own constituents than to have sex with their secretary.
The results of this study have implications for democratic citizenship, political parties,
and the press. It is important to address, however, an important limitation in the argument put
forth in this study: not everyone conceptualizes the national press as a “political institution” or an
“intermediary” “Fourth Branch” of American government designed to act as another set of actors
in the political sphere (Cook, 1996; 2005; Schudson, 1981; 2002; 2011). Crucially, the press may
also be conceptualized as economic organizations, “businesses” that sell news “products” and are
beholden not to citizens but to their own “customers” (Hamilton, 2004). If we accept that the
national media are simply business organizations out to make a buck, then very little of the
preceding argument matters since the press cannot be held responsible for actions that shore up
its financial bottom line at the expense of an under- or ill-informed citizenry.
Compelling theoretical arguments have been made concerning the role of the press as a
democratic institution (see especially, Cook, 1996; 2005; Schudson, 1981; 2002; 2011) and the
failure of that institution to address political scandals and lesser controversies (Entman, 2012).
Yet these arguments, influential as they may be, are not without criticism. Equally persuasive
arguments have been offered, mainly by members of the journalism community, that the press is
merely an organization in the business of selling information to consumers (see Fallows, 1997;
McChesney, 2004; Schudson, 2011). When cries of partisan bias or objections about the
perceived failures of the press to inform the citizenry are made, the response from the journalism
community is that news is a business, one that depends on audience interest for financial
sustainability. Media professionals argue that their business will go under if the news doesn’t
continually alter its format and patterns of coverage to compete for audience attention with “soft
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news” shows like Comedy Central’s Daily Show with Jon Stewart, or with pure entertainment
such as professional football games or HBO dramas. While print newspapers may maintain a
loyal base of “hard news” readers, market competition on cable and the Internet keeps news
production moving at a breakneck pace, with the more sensational and titillating, but not
necessarily more substantial topics, making headlines. A “scandal-minded” (Fallows, 1997, p. 3)
press with an eye on ratings rather than informing the electorate makes for entertaining news
programming. If the press is merely a conglomeration of businesses that convey political
information to the public, then an entertaining press is sufficient and acceptable.
A second limitation of this study rests in another normative assumption: that the average
sexual scandal is not worthy of the volume of coverage it receives. An argument could be made
that sex scandals are not only highly relevant to moralizing politicians who make promises to be
ethical leaders, but to anyone holding high public office. Additionally, it could be suggested that
a sex scandal may reveal something more sinister about an official’s character, particularly if the
official makes efforts to deny accusations of actual sexual misconduct. Character traits matter to
voters, and if a sexual scandal reveals a defect in an official’s character, it may therefore be
important for journalists to pursue accusations of sexual misconduct (Entman, 2012, p. 49).
Yet this argument relies on its own set of assumptions. First and foremost, it makes a
slippery slope assumption that the official’s action in the private realm (e.g., an extramarital
affair) has a direct influence on ethical decision making in general or on policy decisions in
particular (e.g., voting on a gender equality bill). This is a problematic leap, since the assumption
is that other, competing forces like the official’s ideology or external party influence do not also
shape decisions about, for instance, whether to vote on a bill protecting equal pay for men and
women. The inverse of this relationship also illustrates a problem with the argument. Consider a
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politician who is a highly ethical individual and who never cheats on his or her spouse, but who
consistently votes on bills that members of the public deem unethical – for example, pro-abortion
or pro-death penalty bills. In such cases, the politician’s private and public behavior is distinct
and compartmentalized in an inverse fashion, with the ethical private behavior seemingly having
nothing to do with the “unethical” policymaking behavior. Second, the argument that sex
scandals may reveal something important about an official’s character commits a moralistic
fallacy in that it assumes that since philandering is deemed wrong by the society we live in, it
must therefore be absolutely wrong. Social mores governing sexual deviance have changed
drastically throughout history. In ancient Greece, senators could legally own slaves and
concubines. Just fifty years ago, it was illegal and “immoral” in many U.S. states for an
interracial couple to marry. As times change, social constructions of proper and deviant sexual
behavior change. What may deemed improper sexual behavior by an elected official today may
have no bearing on what is considered improper ten, twenty or fifty years from now.
Recognizing the caveat that the implications of this study depend on how one
conceptualizes the media’s role in democracy – as a political institution or business – and on
whether one deems a sex scandal as revelatory of defect in an official’s character or judgment,
this study proceeds by outlining broad consequences for citizens, parties, and the press.
Citizens. Democracy functions through the popular election of leaders who represent the
public will (Clawson & Oxley, 2012). For democracy to function properly, citizens must have
the necessary information to elect leaders who best represent their interests. No matter how one
conceptualizes the news media’s role in democracy, the press has assumed the task of delivering
political information to citizens. And if the news media does its job poorly, if it gives credence to
political minutia while overlooking corruption, then citizens may unable to fulfill their duties.
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All news media are driven by institutional habits that create a fragmented and episodic
image of political reality, and that leave citizens with a distorted view of the political world
(Kinder & Iyengar, 2010). When news media play partisan games, audiences are routinely left
with false or underdeveloped perceptions of politics, including which political issues should be
considered “most important” to address (Morris, 2005; Stroud, 2011). Likewise, by giving
credence to the sexual liaisons of elected officials through frequent coverage, the press may
create the illusion that citizens should care more about what goes on in their representative’s
bedroom than about the shady transactions their representative is making in his office.
In fact, citizens who possess high levels of political knowledge may be especially
susceptible to this kind of perception. Politically sophisticated individuals may biased processors
of scandal information, having the framework necessary to connect news about trivial sexual
affairs to the “game” of partisan politics. Knowledgeable citizens are typically more tolerant of
the rights of minority political groups (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), have more consistent and
well-defined policy attitudes, and are better able to assign credit or blame to the responsible
political officials (Gomez & Wilson, 2001; Sturgis & Smith, 2010). However, knowledgeable
individuals are also better able to connect their pre-existing store of political knowledge with
news media cues and frames, siding with even weak arguments if they are in favor of their party
or ideological persuasion (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; 2007b; Druckman et al., 2013). Evidently
individuals with high levels of knowledge are also more susceptible to news about sex scandals.
If the news media harps on a sex scandal, it appears to have a stronger, negative effect on
evaluations provided by politically sophisticated citizens. Financial scandals, while receiving far
less media attention, are viewed as more damaging by citizens at all levels of sophistication.
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Political Parties. Party objectives are often strategic, with a primary goal being for party
image to be constantly improved or at least maintained. Image is power in the world of politics,
at least symbolic power. When scandal accusations are made about a political official, group
objectives appear to be prioritized above the career objective’s of an individual party member.
Scandals that generate intense publicity may reflect poorly on party image, potentially damaging
reputation and weakening party trust (Marion, 2010; Thompson, 2000). Nevertheless, it may be
possible for an official accused of a sensational scandal, even a sex scandal, to weather the media
firestorm and retain their office without simultaneously sacrificing the party’s image or having
public attention shift from the party’s policy agenda to the scandalous activities of its members.
In the past, political parties appear to force official resignations to reduce scandal
publicity and put party business on track. One assumption underlying this strategy is that
publicity will remain constant or increase as time progresses. Indeed, as opposition party
officials release statements regarding the scandal, or new information is leaked to journalists, it is
possible that even trivial scandals will remain in the public eye. And yet institutional routines
and economic incentives dictate that the press cannot focus too intently on any one scandal
(Entman, 2012). Journalists are in constant search of the new, the timely, and the entertaining.
While provocative scandals may pique initial interest and generate intense media scrutiny, the
press is motivated to keep stories fresh. At some point, the press must move on.
The implication is that political parties should not be so quick to force the hand of
officials accused of trivial scandals. Former Representative Anthony Weiner provides a good
case in point. Weiner was widely considered a rising force in the Democratic Party. He had
earned the trust of his constituents and maintained the reputation of an official who would
confront members of the Republican opposition in the House. Following his “sexting” scandal
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and the accompanying publicity, Democratic officials forced Weiner to resign (Hernandez, 2011).
It may have seemed to party officials, at the time, that the wall-to-wall media coverage would
never end. However, the press cannot and does not focus on events for inordinate periods of time.
As national and world events occurred, as the media agenda became more “congested” with
more pressing issues, it is unlikely that Weiner’s sexual escapades would have remained in the
headlines (Boydstun, 2013). In other words, the Democratic Party might have retained Weiner
had they not acted on the increasing publicity. How could this have been accomplished?
One strategy may involve impression managing the scandal coverage. Publicly, parties
could place pressure on a likeminded official to resign. This gives the impression that the party is
concerned with the misbehavior of one of their members and is willing to penalize the official.
Behind closed doors, however, the party could draw ranks and provide support for the accused
rather than forfeiting the official’s office. From the official’s perspective, it is never wise to
admit to engaging in scandalous activities (Sigal et al., 1988). Denials of misconduct are more
persuasive and reduce damage to the official’s reputation. Yet evidence of official wrongdoing,
for instance photographic evidence of sexual misbehavior, will motivate admission of guilt. In
this case, it is wise for the official to admit guilt, apologize and suggest he will seek help. After
making such claims public, the official should remain silent unless new charges are made. Public
statements should only refer to policymaking and the regular business of serving constituents.
The logic underlying this strategy is made apparent by the foregoing analyses. Citizens
appear unwilling to punish official’s accused of salacious sexual misconduct at the ballot box,
especially if the official is otherwise popular and effective (Fischle, 2000). Citizens may also
resist, and even resent, intense scrutiny of sex scandals, placing more blame on press for
seemingly unfair coverage than on the accused official (Marion, 2010). After the media
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overcommitted itself to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, it became clear that there are limits to
how much attention the press can give to the sexual activities of its elected leaders. The press is
aware, in other words, that it must turn its attention away from a scandal eventually. New events
will demand press attention turn elsewhere. Citizens may be initially interested in coverage of
sex scandals, but will become frustrated if the media lingers too long on a particular scandal. The
implication is clear: unless a sex scandal involves illegal activity, the official should remain in
power. The official’s own constituents will likely be willing to forgive him; only the media holds
the power to act as an overzealous conduit for opposition party claims about the official’s
wrongdoing, and bring the official’s career to a close. This power can be mitigated, with time.
The Press. There has been debate over whether the press has any real power, or whether
it acts merely as a channel through which the power of officials is exercised (Schudson, 2011).
Regardless of the power of the press in promoting scandal, scandal publicity adds legitimacy to
official claims of misconduct, resulting in real world electoral outcomes. Whether the press is
responsible for removing officials from office, or whether it acts simply as a conduit for partisan
politics, the press inevitably brings unwanted attention to the seamy underside of the political
world. The economic incentives and institutional routines that motivate scandal coverage have
for-profit media habitually scrambling to the latest scandal, the democratic or legal ramifications
of the scandal notwithstanding. Can the press, or should the press change its ways?
If one conceives the press to be a intermediary political institution, a “Fourth Branch of
Government” that keeps citizens aware of government corruption, then the press should
“properly calibrate” coverage to the level of the accused misconduct (Entman, 2012). The press
could become more active in sorting the trivial and entertaining from the mundane and severe
forms of political corruption transpiring in the hallowed halls of government. As it stands, the
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press is not proactive in gauging scandal severity; it is reactionary. The media respond to claims
of scandal with a knee-jerk reflex. Scandal coverage is almost an involuntary response to the new
and sensational, and while individual reporters may deliberate on how much attention a
particular scandal should be paid, this study makes clear that the journalistic community does not
weigh carefully the import of a given case of official misbehavior. If they did, financial scandals
that violate democratic norms would generate more coverage, on average, than sex scandals.
This study adds to a growing body of work (Entman, 2012; Fallows, 1997; Iyengar &
Kinder, 2010; McChesney, 2004; Patterson, 1994; Patterson, 2013) that suggests that the press is
ill equipped to handle the intricacies of official behavior. The press has the ability to ignore the
lesser evils of elected representatives in favor of investigations that expose deeper forms of
government corruption. Yet at the first whiff of a sensational story, and with official claims of
misconduct at their disposal, the press responds with vigor. In the short term, this may generate
public attention, potentially garnering more advertising revenue. However, the media also runs
the risk of alienating their audiences through overzealous coverage (Marion, 2010) that focuses
on infotainment and sensationalism. In the long term, public confidence in the news media’s
ability to report important information about government may be eroded if the press continues to
focus on the trivial and inane controversies that afflict government personnel. What kinds of
actions could individual journalists and editors, and the press as a whole, undertake to provide
more accurate and balanced coverage of political scandal? There are several steps the press could
take to adjust its coverage to correspond to the severity of a political scandal.
Recommendations for Scandal Coverage
Based on this study’s findings, there are several recommendations that may better
calibrate scandal coverage to the severity of the alleged misconduct. Some of these
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recommendations involve feasible, short-term alterations that could better attune press coverage
to the seriousness of scandal. Others may seem like radical suggestions or unworkable solutions
to the problem. In the long term, such recommendations may move from the realm of fantasy to
reality, becoming more plausible as scandal coverage continues to miss the mark.
Set Institutional Standards for Coverage. Journalists may argue that an official’s
sexual misconduct may reveal something essential about their character that voters need to know
in order to make informed democratic decisions (Entman, 2012). This study does not suggest that
sex scandals should go publicity free. Sex scandals may indeed reveal a troubling pattern of
abuse that suggests more serious offenses may be committed. However, an extramarital affair
may reveal only that an official is suffering through a lonely marriage and has acted in a way that
other people perceive as sexually deviant. Is it the job of the press to cover such private affairs,
particularly if they pose no serious legal threat or violate campaign promises? Some journalists
may respond in the affirmative. Nevertheless ethicists argue that public figures still maintain a
“zone of privacy” in which personal matters may be off limits to enterprising reporters (Nelson
et al., 2002). Do sex scandals fall within this zone of privacy? One way the press could
acknowledge sex scandals without overcommitting attention would be to ask set institutional
standards for scandal coverage. Specifically, journalists could be required to address several
critical questions about the details of particular scandal scenarios before pursuing coverage.
First, does the sexual misconduct involve a clear and egregious abuse of office? Sex
scandals range from private extramarital affairs that affect only the persons immediately
involved in a romantic entanglement, to scandals like that of former South Carolina Governor
Mark Sanford that include the abuse of taxpayer money to fund sexual liaisons in foreign
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countries. If a sex scandal involves an abuse of office, especially one that uses public monies for
private behavior, then such a scandal may warrant more extensive coverage.
Second, does the scandal involve illegal activity? Journalists could gauge coverage of sex
scandals by asking whether the accusations include criminal misconduct. While an extramarital
affair may be the private business of a politician and his spouse, an extramarital affair that
involves a minor, for example, indicates that the official is willing to break the law. Both forms
of extramarital affairs may be considered sexually deviant. Yet the latter type involves an
additional layer of misconduct that damages the moral authority of the elected official. It
indicates that the leader is willing to flout the rule of law, not simply social mores regulating how
people should behave sexually. And such an accusation may warrant additional media attention.
Third, does the scandal violate campaign promises or policymaking objectives and
promote a sense of hypocrisy? There is some debate about whether leaders should be held
accountable for not meeting every campaign promise made during election season (Nelson et al.,
2002; Patterson, 1994). The media tend to take representatives to task for unfulfilled campaign
promises, even though the realities of governing often prevent candidates from fulfilling their
promises once elected. While politicians rarely make specific promises about “not cheating” on
their spouse, they sometimes make claims to moral leadership, or “restoring a sense of morality
to Washington” upon election to political office. Constituents may perceive leaders who make
such moral claims, and who pursue “moral [policy] agendas” while secretly engaging in what
may be perceived as immoral sexual activity, as hypocrites. A case could be made that the media
should pay more attention to these scandals, since they present a conflict between the official’s
private behavior and their behavior as a candidate and as an elected representative.
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An alternative way of gauging the extent of sex scandal coverage would be to employ
Bok’s (1999) “test of publicity.” This test forces the decision maker – the reporter, in this case –
to first consult their own conscience regarding the nature of their decision. How will non-stop
coverage of a sex scandal damage the politician’s reputation? What about the politician’s
spouse? What about his or her family? Second, Bok (1999) suggests that the decision maker
should seek advice from friends and colleagues who can provide a detached but expert
assessment of the situation. For a reporter assigned to cover a sex scandal, this may mean
consulting journalists at other organizations. The key is start a dialogue about the scope and
impact of the decision, in this case, the extent of coverage a sex scandal should receive. Finally,
Bok (1999) suggests the decision maker should consult individuals who would be affected by the
decision, or in lieu of this, engage in a hypothetical conversation with the individuals affected.
Here the idea is to raise objections that the individual reporter or the reporter’s colleagues may
fail to realize, with the ultimate goal of Bok’s (1999) test being to come to an ethical decision.
Imagine a media environment in which journalists were forced to confront the three
questions mentioned above and Bok’s (1999) test of publicity. If such institutional guidelines
were mandatory, the majority of sex scandals would likely receive little or no attention. The
Clinton-Lewinsky affair, for instance, may never have created such a stir had the media
answered these questions before investigating. In fact, the Lewinsky affair may not have come to
public attention at all. How would a lack of attention to the Lewinsky scandal affected
perceptions of Clinton, or the media, or the Republican opposition? By 1998 it was already well
known that Clinton was not the most faithful spouse, as much media attention had already been
paid to previous scandals. If they had ignored the Lewinsky scandal, the media would not have
suffered any backlash from the public for paying too much attention. The same would be true of
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the Republican opposition in Congress, many of whom were revealed to be involved in sexual
scandals in the process (Zaller, 1998). In sum, the trust that the public places in the “watchdog”
press, the president and the congress may have been better off without any attention being paid
to the Lewinsky scandal. This is mere speculation about a reality that does not exist. Were the
media willing to adopt a standard for gauging scandal coverage, however, the Lewinsky scandal
and that of Anthony Weiner’s would have never made headline news.
Don’t Further Incentivize Partisan Scandal Warfare. One reason that sex scandals
may generate relatively more coverage than financial scandals is that opposition party officials
know sex scandals will receive ample coverage. In this way, scandal coverage is like the chicken
and the egg. It’s a problem of endogeneity, to put it in more technical terms. The question is
which variable causes the other? Do partisan officials pay attention to the other side’s sexual
misbehavior knowing that repeated statements about the scandal will create a media firestorm, or
does the tendency for media to scrutinize sex scandals motivate partisans to pursue allegations of
sexual misconduct? These are difficult questions to answer based on the available evidence. And
yet the history of modern scandal coverage suggests both causal mechanisms may be at work.
Partisans are likely aware that the media will lock on to accusations of misconduct, causing an
image problem for the party that will eventually result in an official resignation and
relinquishment of actual power. Meanwhile, the fact that it is journalistic routine to pay attention
to official statements, and the evidence put forth here showing that the press pays substantial
amounts of attention to political scandals, gives incentives for partisans to pursue scandals of
even the most trivial, sexual variety. One way to disrupt this scenario is for blanket refusals to
engage in partisan scandal warfare, to ignore partisan claims about sexual dalliances.
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Reporters may react negatively to this recommendation, perhaps with good reason. Since
institutional routines dictate that reporters rely on official sources for coverage, reporters who
ignore partisan claims of sexual misconduct may risk alienating and losing their sources. A
reporter’s ability to “work their sources” is in many ways the foundation of his livelihood.
Moreover, partisan deliberation and debate is supposed to be a major part of front-page news
(Schudson, 1981). So, why shouldn’t a reporter follow up on official statements about sexual
misconduct? After all, one role of a democratic press is to relay political information to the
public, and what is a political sex scandal but political information? And isn’t it unfair to tell
journalists how to do their job, when the First Amendment protects their speech?
All of these concerns are warranted. The fact remains, however, that by giving a platform
to trivial partisan scandal warfare, journalists may inadvertently undermine the very principles
that protect their speech. It may be a journalist’s job to report political information, and it is
essential for the journalist to do so in an uninhibited fashion. Reporting on sex scandals may
generate audience interest, at least for a time, and enhance a news organization economically.
Nevertheless, by devoting wall-to-wall coverage to partisan bickering over trivial sexual minutia,
the press may give credence to critics like Representative Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, who
suggested the press is overly partisan, focused on entertainment rather than hard-hitting public
affairs and should therefore be curtailed (Stelter, 2010). By focusing on entertaining sex scandals,
the press may give more value to arguments that threaten their constitutional guarantees.
Consider Long-Term Audience Interests and Benefits. If the media produces news
“products” for “consumers” (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; 1995) it should be wary of
alienating its consumer base. Important to this recommendation is that what is more sensational
and entertaining and flashy is not always what is best for the “consumer” or the citizen. What is
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the news business, similar in many ways to other commercial organizations, willing to risk?
Would a car company risk building expensive, flashy sedans that occasionally and spontaneously
explode if it knew that the public would find out and cease buying the car? Would a clothing
retailer sell a luxurious, flamboyantly colored and popular line of shirts that also contained
highly toxic chemicals if it thought the public would discover the deception and stop buying the
line? Would the news media continue to publicize sensational but trivial information about
political sex scandals while downplaying deeper forms of government corruption if news
producers thought their audiences and advertising revenues would dry up? News is, in part, an
information product. And citizens can drop any product like a bad habit.
In the short term, it makes sense for the press to be “scandal-minded” (Fallows, 1997), to
pay heed to claims about official misconduct, no matter how trivial. The question is whether this
style of reporting will provide long-term economic sustainability. Over the past decade, the
mainstream press has taken major economic hits, forcing newsrooms to cut their professional
staff, streamline the production process, and focus on soft news to compete with more
entertaining fare and garner younger audience interest (Hamilton, 2004). The hit to the news
business is thought to have come from the advent of the Internet and mainstream news
organizations’ inability to recognize the power of that new medium. Indeed, news organizations
may have sown the seeds of their own destruction when they put free content online during the
early days of the Internet. Audiences now expect free content. The 2008 economic recession also
hit the news industry hard, creating further cutbacks and layoffs. Thousands of journalism jobs
that had existed before the 2008 recession simply were not replaced. Between the Internet and
the 2008 recession, mainstream journalism has not recovered its previous vitality.
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The roots of the problem with the economy of the press run deeper, however, than the
advent of the Internet and the 2008 recession. For decades, the American public has been
dissatisfied with how the press covers politics and Gallup polling shows a majority of Americans
now say they do not trust the mainstream press (Gallup, 2012). The press is routinely one of the
most disliked institutions of American society, if not of American government. Why is that so?
One reason may be an increasingly “scandal-minded” press that pays more attention to
entertaining political gamesmanship than to policy and substance (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997;
Entman, 2012; Fallows, 1997; Patterson, 1994; Pingree, 2011). Citizens, especially highly
interested and aware citizens, want to know about government corruption. They do not want the
press to focus on the trivial and sensational at the expense of substance. The press needs the
ability to exercise its freedom of speech uninhibited. The press may benefit economically from
publishing sensational scandal news in the short term. Yet without paying attention to long-term
audience issue interests and democratic benefits, the press risks disaffecting audiences. It risks its
bottom line. Most importantly, the press risks its seat at the table of American democracy.
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APPENDIX A. SCANDAL CASES IN PEW CONTENT ANALYSIS

Legislative Branch Scandal
(Years analyzed)

Favors
Dems/Reps?

Type

Total News
Stories

Anthony Weiner (D-NY) “sexting”
(2011)

Reps

Sexual

237

Bob Ney (R-OH) involvement in
Abramoff scandal (2007-2008)

Dems

Financial

14

Charlie Rangel (D-NY) House ethics
controversy and censure (2009-2010)

Reps

Financial

204

David Wu (D-OR) accused of sexually
assaulting a teenage girl (2011)

Reps

Sexual

15

Eric Massa (D-NY) “tickling”
harassment (2010)

Reps

Sexual

60

GOP bondage scandal (2010)

Dems

Sexual

33

John Ensign (R-NV) affair (2009-2011)

Dems

Sexual

91

Larry Craig (R-ID) arrested for lewd
behavior in airport restroom (2007-2008)

Dems

Sexual

383

Mark Foley (R-FL) congressional page
sex scandal (2007-2008)

Dems

Sexual

14

Mark Souder (R-IN) extramarital affair
(2010)

Dems

Sexual

4

Maxine Waters (D-CA) House ethics trial
(2010)

Reps

Financial

28

Ted Stevens (R-AL) home renovation
scandal (2007-2008)

Dems

Financial

233

Tim Mahoney (D-FL) sex scandal (2008)

Reps

Sexual

11

William Jefferson (D-LA) bribery
scandal (2007-2008)

Reps

Financial

74

104

DC escort scandal (2007-2008)

Dems

Sexual

99

Abramoff scandal in general (2007-2011)

Dems

Financial

24

Former Senator John Edwards (D-NC)
affair (2008-2012)

Reps

Sexual

418

Note: n number of stories derived from Pew News Coverage Index (NCI), 2007-2012.

Executive Branch Scandal
(Years analyzed)

Favors
Dems/Reps?

Type

Total News
Stories

Paul Wolfowitz Worldbank affair (2007)

Dems

Sexual

81

Norman Hsu fundraising scandal (2009)

Reps

Financial

24

Interior Department sex for oil scandal
(2009)

Reps

Sexual

22

Solyndra controversy (2011)

Reps

Financial

92

Secret service prostitution scandal (2012)

Reps

Sexual

165

Note: Cell entries represent n number of stories about political scandal, by news source.

Judicial Branch Scandal
(Years analyzed)
Clearance Thomas’ wife calls Anita Hill
requesting apology for accusations

Favors
Dems/Reps?

Type

Total News
Stories

Dems

Sexual

21

Note: Cell entries represent n number of stories about political scandal, by news source.
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Gubernatorial Scandal
(Years analyzed)

Favors
Dems/Reps?

Type

Total News
Stories

Mark Sanford disappearance and affair
(2009-2011)

Dems

Sexual

214

Governor Rod Blagojevich (D-IL)
senate seat scandal (2008-2011)

Reps

Financial

1,282

Former Governor Jon Corzine (D-NJ)
MF Global scandal

Reps

Financial

30

Governor Eliot Spitzer (D-NY) hired
prostitutes

Reps

Sexual

286

Note: Cell entries represent n number of stories about political scandal, by news source.
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Hall admits to improper
sexual relationships
By John Simpson | Staff Writer

After dodging questions for nearly
a week, Republican Senator Sam Hall
admitted today that he had multiple
extramarital affairs and apologized
for behavior he characterized as
“disgraceful.”
“Let me just be explicit that I am
admitting to it, to having affairs,”
Hall said in an interview this
afternoon. “My personal behavior
has been unacceptable.”
In the approximately 20-minute
long interview, Hall did not say
exactly how many women he had
affairs with. “I don’t know what
other women are going to come
out,” he said.
But he discussed one woman
specifically. He said a passionate
affair with Miss Barbara Allen began
during his 2008 campaign and had
gone on intermittently until 2010.
He said his relationship with Allen
– a former campaign worker and
one-time employee in his federal
office “was totally inappropriate.”
“It shows terrible judgment on
my part,” he said, adding, “To allow
myself to be put into that position
was just stupid.”
Hall said that Republican Senator

John Cornyn had confronted him
in 2008 about his extramarital affair
and said “if that’s happening, stop.”
“It wasn’t a discussion, it wasn’t
a meeting, it was a statement,” Hall
said.
Asked why he didn’t heed such
warnings he said he’d made a series
of bad decisions.
While he said the people of his
state deserved better leadership,
he said he would let them decide
whether his personal indiscretions
disqualified him from office.
“I let them down and I apologize
for that,” he said.

History’s lesson in Afghanistan
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The economic policies of the major powers are the main reasons for the
global economic meltdown, Ahmadinezhad said here on Tuesday at the third
meeting of economic affairs and finance ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization.
They have imposed a unified monetary system on the global economy

Hall admits to improper
sexual relationships
By John Simpson | Staff Writer

After dodging questions for
nearly a week, Democratic Senator
Sam Hall admitted today that he
had multiple extramarital affairs
and apologized for behavior he
characterized as “disgraceful.”
“Let me just be explicit that I am
admitting to it, to having affairs,”
Hall said in an interview this
afternoon. “My personal behavior
has been unacceptable.”
In the approximately 20-minute
long interview, Hall did not say
exactly how many other women he
had affairs with. “I don’t know what
other women are going to come
out,” he said.
But he discussed one woman
specifically. He said a passionate
affair with Miss Barbara Allen began
during his 2008 campaign and had
gone on intermittently until 2010.
He said his relationship with Allen
– a former campaign worker and
one-time employee in his federal
office “was totally inappropriate.”
“It shows terrible judgment on
my part,” he said, adding, “To allow
myself to be put into that position
was just stupid.”
Hall said that Democratic Senator

Patrick Leahy had confronted him
in 2008 about his extramarital affair
and said “if that’s happening, stop.”
“It wasn’t a discussion, it wasn’t
a meeting, it was a statement,” Hall
said.
Asked why he didn’t heed such
warnings he said he’d made a series
of bad decisions.
While he said the people of his
state deserved better leadership,
he said he would let them decide
whether his personal indiscretions
disqualified him from office.
“I let them down and I apologize
for that,” he said.
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The economic policies of the major powers are the main reasons for the
global economic meltdown, Ahmadinezhad said here on Tuesday at the third
meeting of economic affairs and finance ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization.
They have imposed a unified monetary system on the global economy

Hall admits to improper
use of campaign funds
By John Simpson | Staff Writer

After dodging questions for nearly
a week, Republican Senator Sam Hall
admitted today that he used campaign
funds to buy $58,000 worth of luxury
items and apologized for behavior he
characterized as “disgraceful.”
“Let me just be explicit that I am
admitting to it, to using the money,”
Hall said in an interview this
afternoon. “My personal behavior has
been unacceptable.”
In the approximately 20-minute
long interview, Hall did not say
exactly how much money he had
taken from campaign funds over the
years. “I don’t know what’s going to
come out,” he said.
But he discussed one item
specifically. He said he purchased
a $25,000 gold-plated men’s Rolex
watch in 2008 which he had repaired
by a jeweler in 2010.
He said his misuse of campaign
funds – including funds from previous
runs for the U.S. House and U.S.
Senate “was totally inappropriate.”
“It shows terrible judgment on
my part,” he said, adding, “To allow
myself to be put into that position
was just stupid.”
Hall said that Republican Senator

John Cornyn had confronted him in
2008 about his misuse of campaign
funds and said “if that’s happening,
stop.”
“It wasn’t a discussion, it wasn’t a
meeting, it was a statement,” Hall said.
Asked why he didn’t heed such
warnings he said he’d made a series of
bad decisions.
While Hall said the people of his
state deserved better leadership, he
said he would let them decide whether
his personal indiscretions disqualified
him from office.
“I let them down and I apologize for
that,” he said.
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The economic policies of the major powers are the main reasons for the
global economic meltdown, Ahmadinezhad said here on Tuesday at the third
meeting of economic affairs and finance ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization.
They have imposed a unified monetary system on the global economy

Hall admits to improper
use of campaign funds
By John Simpson | Staff Writer

After dodging questions for nearly
a week, Democratic Senator Sam Hall
admitted today that he used campaign
funds to buy $58,000 worth of luxury
items and apologized for behavior he
characterized as “disgraceful.”
“Let me just be explicit that I am
admitting to it, to using the money,”
Hall said in an interview this
afternoon. “My personal behavior has
been unacceptable.”
In the approximately 20-minute
long interview, Hall did not say
exactly how much money he had
taken from campaign funds over the
years. “I don’t know what’s going to
come out,” he said.
But he discussed one item
specifically. He said he purchased
a $25,000 gold-plated men’s Rolex
watch in 2008 which he had repaired
by a jeweler in 2010.
He said his misuse of campaign
funds – including funds from previous
runs for the U.S. House and U.S.
Senate “was totally inappropriate.”
“It shows terrible judgment on
my part,” he said, adding, “To allow
myself to be put into that position
was just stupid.”
Hall said that Democratic Senator

Patrick Leahy had confronted him in
2008 about his misuse of campaign
funds and said “if that’s happening,
stop.”
“It wasn’t a discussion, it wasn’t a
meeting, it was a statement,” Hall said.
Asked why he didn’t heed such
warnings he said he’d made a series of
bad decisions.
While Hall said the people of his
state deserved better leadership, he
said he would let them decide whether
his personal indiscretions disqualified
him from office.
“I let them down and I apologize for
that,” he said.
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AUSTRALIAN soldiers are starting to die in Afghanistan. Its president,
Hamid Karzai, operates more like the mayor of Kabul than the leader of
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APPENDIX C. SCANDAL CASES IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTORAL MODEL

Name

PID Type Description

Result

Brown,
Corrine

D

F

Allegedly took $10,000 check from church leader
Henry Lyons

Won

Campbell,
John

R

F

Investigated for fundraising activities during a vote
on financial reform

Won

Chenoweth,
Helen

R

S

Admitted that she had carried on a six-year affair
with married rancher Vernon Ravenscroft

Won

Clarke,
Yvette

D

F

Allegedly took trip to Caribbean funded by Carib
News

Won

Condit,
Gary

D

S

Had extramarital affair with intern Chandra Levy

Lost

Crowley,
Joseph

D

F

Investigated for fundraising activities during a vote
on financial reform

Won

Cunningham,
Randy "Duke"

R

F

Improper financial relationships with defense
contracting firm MZM Inc.

Resigned

DeLay,
Tom

R

F

Money laundering; involvement in Abramoff
scandal; numerous power violations

Resigned

Dicks,
Norm

D

F

Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA)

Won

Doolittle,
John

R

F

Tainted campaign contributions, from Indian tribes
and from Abramoff; involved in Abramoff scandal

Won

Feeney,
Tom

R

F

Took trips on Abramoff's dime; took $1,000 from
Jack Abramoff

Won

Foley,
Mark

R

S

Fossella,
Vito

R

S

Asked male congressional pages to send photos of
themselves to him; caught with sexually explicit text
messages from pages
Admitted to having an affair and fathering child out
of wedlock
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Resigned
Lost

Graves,
Sam

R

F

Alleged to use small business committee
chairmanship to get friend to testify on biofuels

Won

Harris,
Katherine

R

F

Took illegal campaign contributions

Lost

Hastert,
Dennis

R

S

Covered up Mark Foley sex scandal

Lost

Hensarling,
Jeb

R

F

Investigated for fundraising activities during a vote
on financial reform

Won

Hyde,
Henry

R

S

From 1965 to 1969, Hyde conducted an extramarital
affair with Cherie Snodgrass

Won

Jackson,
Jesse Jr.

D

F

Won

Jefferson,
William

D

F

Thought to be Senate candidate number 5, considered
by Blagojevich to fulfill Obama's seat in exchange
for raising funds
Demanded bribes in exchange for his help in
promoting a pair of business deals in Africa

Kaptur,
Marcy

D

F

Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA)

Won

Kilpatrick,
Carolyn
Cheeks

D

F

Allegedly took trip to Caribbean funded by Carib
News

Lost

Kolbe,
Jim

R

S

Helped cover up Mark Foley page sex scandal

Lost

Lee,
Christopher

R

S

Sent shirtless photo to transsexual prostitute via
Craiglist; soliciting sex

Resigned

Lewis,
Charles
Jeremy

R

F

Used position to steer clients to Lowery lobbying
firm, which got them $; Lowery then gave campaign
$ to Lewis

Livingston,
Bob

R

S

Had extramarital affair

Lucas,
Frank

R

F

Investigated for fundraising activities

Won

Mahoney,
Tim

D

S

Mahoney paid hush money to a mistress to conceal
an extramarital affair

Lost
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Won

Won

Resigned

Massa,
Eric

D

S

Groped multiple male staffers; Sexual harassment

Resigned

Mollohan,
Alan

D

F

Misrepresented his assets on financial disclosure
forms

Won

Moran,
Jerry

R

F

Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA)

Won

Ney,
Bob

R

F

Investigated for bribery implicated in Abarmoff
scandals

Payne,
Donald

D

F

Allegedly took trip to Caribbean funded by Carib
News

Won

Pomeroy,
Earl

D

F

Investigated for fundraising activities during a vote
on financial reform

Lost

Price,
Tom

R

F

Investigated for fundraising activities during a vote
on financial reform

Won

Rangel,
Charles

D

F

Didn't pay taxes on Dominican home

Won

Renzi,
Rick

R

F

Conspiracy, fraud, money laundering, etc.

Won

Schrock,
Ed

R

S

Allegedly had sex with a male prostitute

Shuster,
E.G. Bud

R

F

Souder,
Mark

R

S

Violated House Gift Rules and had poor records of
campaign expenditures; power issues related to Ann
Eppard
Resigned after admitting to an affair with a female
staff member

Stark,
Fortney Pete

D

F

Allegedly claimed Maryland home as primary
residence to get tax exemption

Won

Thompson,
Bennie

D

F

Allegedly took trip to Carribean funded by Carib
News

Won

Tiahrt,
Todd

R

F

Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA)

Lost
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Resigned

Resigned
Won
Resigned

Watt,
Melvin

D

F

Investigated for fundraising activities

Won

Visclosky,
Peter

D

F

Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA),

Won

Waters,
Maxine

D

F

Investigated by House EC for trying to funnel federal
funds to her husband's OneUnited Bank

Won

Weiner,
Anthony

D

S

Sent sexually explicit messages to women

Weldon,
Curt

R

F

Used his influence to secure lobbying and consulting
contracts for his daughter

Lost

Wu,
David

D

S

Resigned

Young,
Bill

R

F

Admitted to an aggressive sexual encounter with the
teenage daughter of a longtime friend and campaign
donor
Investigated by House Ethics Committee for
connections with lobbyist Pual Magliochhetti (PMA)

Young,
Don

R

F

Investigated for illegal campaign contributions

Resigned

Won
Won

Note: The “electoral outcome” reflects the electoral outcome following revelations of a scandal.
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APPENDIX D. ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL OUTCOMES MODEL USING CNN

Lose Reelection
(vs. Win Reelection)

Resign
(vs. Win Reelection)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.11*
(0.05)

-0.14*
(0.06)

Leader

-1.03
(1.29)

-0.88
(1.07)

0.33
(0.70)

0.31
(0.70)

Republican

-0.70
(0.73)

-0.54
(0.70)

0.41
(0.97)

0.49
(1.08)

Vote Share

-0.11†
(0.06)

-0.10†
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.06)

-0.70
(1.02)

-0.85
(1.03)

-2.07†
(1.06)

-2.29*
(1.06)

0.02**
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.02)

0.03***
(0.01)

0.04***
(0.01)

---

-0.70†
(0.39)

---

0.19
(0.41)

33.27%
-37.79***
51
30.40%

35.62%
-36.46***
51
26.10%

33.27%
-37.79***
51
30.40%

43.19%
-26.94***
51
26.10%

Controls
Tenure

IVs
Financial Scandal
Media Exposure
Interaction
Scandal X Media
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N
PRE

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.
Alternative model using CNN transcripts mentioning political scandal, 1996-2012.
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